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**GlavPU's Agitprop Dep Chief On Komsomol,
Military-Patriotic Education**
*18010227 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Oct 88 First Edition p 2*

[Interview with Gen Lt N.Shapalin, Deputy Chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Soviet Army and Navy's Chief Political Directorate, by Lt Col B.Khudoleyev: "In the Memory of the Fallen" under the "Timely Interview" rubric; first two paragraphs are a boldface introduction]

[Text] Recently, a joint meeting of the Board of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the VLKSM Central Committee's Secretariat was held; it discussed the question of preserving the memory of those who fought for the Motherland and of intensifying military-patriotic education of the young people. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's questions are answered here by one of the meeting's participants, Lieutenant General N.Shapalin, Deputy Chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Soviet Army and Navy's Chief Political Directorate.

[Question] Nikolay Vasilyevich, a lot has been done lately in this country to preserve the memory of those who fought for the Motherland. The search movement is growing, and new monuments and obelisks are being erected. And yet, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's mail contains a never-diminishing flow of letters recounting instances of callous attitude to the monuments to the fallen. We still receive many letters from family members and friends of servicemen who died in the war, asking us to find their burial sites or find out about the missing in action.

I know that many such letters come to your department as well. This shows that in the task of preserving the memory of those who fought for the Motherland deficiencies remain. This is apparently the reason why it was deemed necessary to discuss those questions once more, is not it?

[Answer] Preservation of the memory of our compatriots and others who honorably fought for socialism and their native land is a task of enormous political importance. Indeed, the work has lately picked up considerably. In addition to local party and soviet entities and veterans' organizations, the Main Political Directorate, the General Staff and the Main Cadre Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense contributed to this. In particular, a number of procedural documents have been drafted and practical measures carried out to assist local soviet entities and search groups. New approaches have been introduced in the organizational and ideological work of commanders, political detachments and military commissariats. Yet, in general, the situation with preservation of the memory of those who fought for the Motherland causes concern. The lofty slogan "No One is Forgotten and Nothing is Forgotten" unfortunately is very far from becoming reality.

[Question] In your report at the meeting you, Nikolay Vasilyevich, mentioned many serious problems. Which one is the most urgent, in your opinion?

[Answer] The famous Russian general Aleksandr Vasilyevich Suvorov once said: "A war can be considered over only when the last soldier who died in it has been buried with full military honors." Well, judged by Suvorov's standard, the Great Patriotic War, over 40 years after the capitulation of Hitlerite Germany and imperialist Japan in 1945, can not be regarded as finished.

Sad though it may be, but the fact remains that at old battlefields in Pskov, Kaluga, Smolensk, Vitebsk, Kalinin and other oblasts remains of Soviet soldiers still lie unburied. This year alone, in just two oblasts—Kaluga and Novgorod—search groups found remains of several hundred of our servicemen in old shell craters and trenches.

Unfortunately, I could give you many other examples showing that government degrees on establishing and maintaining soldiers' graves—which were issued twice, in 1946 and 1979—have not been carried out fully. At many sites—including the Vostryakovskoye cemetery in Moscow—monuments and markers on common graves have been let to crumble and proper care for burial sites has not been organized. I think that this is one of the most important problems today, one that must be addressed immediately.

[Question] Among first-order tasks we should probably list the need to pay more attention to organizing search groups, should we not? They have accomplished a great deal in the past. Currently, this patriotic movement of the young people is on the upswing. But are you not bothered by a shadow side of that movement?

[Answer] The VLKSM Central Committee's coordinating council, established last spring, supervises 500 search groups. The majority of young war historians are doing an important and useful patriotic task. Against the background of this lofty movement, the other phenomenon can not be tolerated. I mean the so-called "black searchers", groups of marauders who open soldiers' graves in search of firearms or medals. A dirty commerce in fascist paraphernalia takes place on the black market. Instances of extreme cynicism have come to light. Such "searchers" must be prosecuted with severity.

This problem has been addressed in detail by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. The society justifiably demands that most drastic measures be taken to stop grave robberies and other, including illegal, manifestations of nihilism which, I must honestly say, our society have not known before.

Speaking of true patriotic searchers, those enthusiasts and volunteers, it is absolutely clear that this important, difficult and lofty work must be put on a more solid

foundation. Currently, however, it is being carried out without appropriate legal, material or financial support. Consequently, its results, unfortunately, remain modest.

[Question] Perhaps another problem is that their work is not only difficult but dangerous as well; those who do it risk their lives.

[Answer] It is true, many places remain where it is not safe for searchers to venture. In many regions of the country where military actions were conducted, a second inspection of the landscape is needed to clear all the remaining mines. Naturally, the kids can not do this vast work themselves, completely on their own. Here, the initiative should come from mine clearing specialists at military districts.

What else could they do in my opinion, besides removing explosive objects? It should be possible for military units to organize classes to teach searchers how to recognize various types of ammunition and to handle it safely. They should supply searchers not only with equipment, hiking gear and maps but with mine detectors and probes; this is being done in some units of the Moscow military district. Military commissariats should try to set up special search groups comprised of reserve mine clearing specialists. Closer interaction between professional servicemen and young volunteers will undoubtedly widen the reach of military patriotic training and increase the preparedness of young men to serve in the Armed Forces.

[Question] Many people are asking in their letters why would we not publish books similar to Polish military writer J.Pszymonowki's [spelling?] famous "Memory", which would lists the names of all those who died in a given region?

[Answer] This is indeed an example worthy of emulation. In our country, incidentally, such work has been going on for years in many cities, rayons and even union republics. For instance, a similar book has recently been published in Belorussia. At the joint meeting of the Ministry of Defense's Board and the VLKSM Central Committee's Secretariat a suggestion was made to publish a book like this for the entire country.

Naturally, this will not be a single volume—it would have too many pages—but a collection of books prepared by individual republics, oblasts and foreign countries, as it has already been done in Poland.

[Question] But would not those book be incomplete, with many pages missing? We do not even have full data on our own losses in the last war.

[Answer] Indeed, the figure of "more than 20 million" seems to be too approximate. To make it more exact we must do a lot more work. Incidentally, this is a task our military historians have been working on.

Another aspect of the problem is that too little has been done so far to correct a glaring injustice: hundreds of thousands of soldiers who died in the last war remain nameless. We do not know the names of many of those who fought for the Motherland and now lie buried at military cemeteries and in common graves on our own soil and abroad. There still remains a large number of soldiers' graves that are totally neglected and are not even registered anywhere.

It is true that the responsibility for preserving the memory of those who fought for the Motherland lies with local soviet entities. Yet, it should be admitted that many garrison commanders and military political officers have not been carrying out their duties. They have clear instructions to take an active part in ispolkoms' work to repair and maintain graves of Soviet soldiers and to set up a reliable system to register all common and individual graves, obelisks and monuments, to produce maps and plans of burial sites and to inspect their condition.

[Question] What should be done to rectify the situation?

[Answer] First of all, we must drop our "campaign" approach and reject attempts to solve this very important problem by way of a "cavalry charge". We need to do systematic and regular work to preserve the memory of those who fought for the Motherland. Signs of this have recently begun to appear. And, I repeat, we must raise the search work to a qualitatively different level. To do this, we have drafted an additional set of measures. This is not being done only locally. We intend to adopt an encouragement policy toward search groups at the Main Cadre Directorate, at the Ministry of Defense archives and at unit museums, and to make access there easier.

We will support all patriotic undertakings by the young people to preserve and add to glorious battle traditions and to strengthen defense consciousness.

In short, the joint meeting of the Ministry of Defense's Board and the VLKSM Central Committee's Secretariat approved a major program to intensify the work to preserve the memory of those who fought for the Motherland and to improve military patriotic education. Such questions as the need to review obsolete regulations, establish responsibilities and fund the program on a more reliable basis have been focused on solidly and urgently.

We feel that at every oblast and rayon where military actions took place special commissions should be set up and invested with special powers; they should be comprised of representatives of party and soviet entities, military commissariats, komsomol, police and veterans' and other citizens' associations.

The task of preserving the memory of those who fought for the Motherland demands efforts from everyone, and everyone must participate in it. Here, no one can remain indifferent.

12892

Higher Commanders, Staffs Should Be Held Responsible For 'Real Results of Work'
*18010217a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Oct 88 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Colonel V. Bogdanovskiy, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Carpathian Military District: "Our Comrade from the Commission—Does the Representative from Higher Headquarters Always Enjoy A Lot of Authority?"]

[Text] Oh, those commissions! What you hear about them in the forces. And as a rule people talk about them without the former respect.

This is totally understandable for today, a time when the party has adopted a course toward overcoming the bureaucratic command style of leadership and perestroika is on-going in all echelons of management, it seems that the very concept of the "commission" smacks of the decay of stagnant times. Nonetheless these commissions are still going out to units and major units and will certainly continue to do so. As the saying goes, there is nowhere to hide because monitoring is monitoring. But...

And you can't get along without discussing this topic at the headquarters of one of the motorized rifle divisions in whose units and subunits I had occasion to work recently.

Lieutenant Colonel A. Stetsenko said, "Would you believe that there are times when all we do is receive one representative from higher headquarters after another. There is no time left for our work.."

Lieutenant Colonel B. Shabashov told me that in just the last two months four commissions and several individual inspectors had visited the unit where he serves...

And you can certainly understand why an officer is dissatisfied when it is difficult for him to combine accomplishing his own immediate duties with supporting the work of every possible commission, a job for which, as we well know, no special time has been allocated. And how do the inspectors themselves evaluate this?

Senior political department representative Lieutenant Colonel A. Stepanok, for example, feels this way. "You could say that previously we were often simply outside

observers in units and we basically carried out inspector functions. Now our work style is different. We ourselves are involved in the matter at hand and we try to provide specific assistance."

Specific assistance... When I hear these words I involuntarily remember a military district council meeting I had occasion to attend. Major General V. Belousov was asked to give a report on the practical measures that he and the officers subordinate to him were providing to improve the quality of the training process in the forces.

After taking the podium he began to read a previously prepared text.

One of the military council members said, "There is no need to give us generalities and to recount inspections that have been made. Let us talk about specifics. Whom have you helped and how? Where and in what areas have you achieved positive results?"

Unfortunately he was not able to give a really satisfactory answer to this direct question. The speaker finally found himself at the mercy of his document.

In sharing his opinion on this subject, First Deputy District Commander Lieutenant General L. Generalov said, "It is a real pity that, just as before, we leaders only look for deficiencies when we are visiting the troops. It doesn't take any special effort. One has to work a lot harder to quickly find a reliable method for correcting matters where things are not going well and to achieve real advances both in the quality of personnel training and in increasing discipline. Yet every general and officer in the command structure has to be ready to do this."

This is precisely what has to be done. Life demands it, for the primary criterion that representatives from senior levels must use to evaluate activities is the actual result of their work. You can say nothing against a commission when the results of its work in a unit or major unit brings about radical changes, for example, in the organizational quality of the training process, but, alas, this is seldom the result that is achieved.

For example, Lieutenant Colonels A. Tonkonog, N. Litvinenko and V. Golodov from division headquarters often visited to inspect the unit where the aforementioned Shabashov is serving. They noted deficiencies in driver training and in the manner in which military equipment and weapons storage and operations were set up. And yet what has changed? As has been shown, driver training level has remained the same. Approximately three months ago six vehicles from the training group went out of action and have as yet not been repaired.

The regimental commander told me, "The inspectors never promised to assist in getting the spare parts, but meanwhile, you yourself can see..."

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

Of course one can now blame the commander for his smugness. He must resolve his problems himself by showing self-dependence, initiative and enterprise. And in general much in these situations frequently rests on exactly that smugness caused by those same commissions. But in this case the problem is not that.

The regimental commander and other officers cannot duck their responsibility for their omissions. Yet we must consider the fact that in this situation the capabilities of the commander and unit staff will not allow them to independently resolve the problem that has arisen. They are simply not able to manage without participation from the services, the division staff and the appropriate military district directorates. Yet unfortunately this participation ran out at the stage where the shortcomings were detected.

And, for example, what can one say about the changes in the work style of the managing agencies to which Lieutenant Colonel Stepanok alluded?

And I can go on. Lieutenant Colonel N. Sakadel, a lecturer from a senior political agency, arrived in that same motorized division before the summer training period began. I don't have to go into detail about what he got involved in. However, before setting out on his official travel, the lecturer was instructed to assist one of the deputy battalion commanders for political affairs re-equip a Lenin Room. This was to be done so that there would be no shame in showing that Lenin Room during a muster of regimental commanders. The lieutenant commander tended the battalion political worker for several days, but naturally he did not find the time to meet with personnel or talk and listen to people.

Unfortunately I cannot consider this event atypical since I also had occasion to see the work of a group of officers headed by Major General Belousov. They were not only to set up and conduct the aforementioned muster with regimental commanders, but were also to assist the officers in preparing for the beginning of exercises. However, just like Lieutenant Colonel Sakadel, many of them were involved in matters that were clearly not within their area. Some of them, along with subunit commanders, watched how things were being put in order in the barracks and the contiguous area. Others carried out those exact functions in the training center. One got the impression that they were not upset by anything but external appearances.

And imagine this. Soon after this rush job in which representatives from the senior headquarters took an active part those same representatives again traveled to the division and cited the fact that the training process in a number of units and subunits was listless and exercises were being conducted at a low methodological level. And furthermore there was a long list of every possible kind of negative comment: the command post at the tank park was not ready to operate; training sites for the exercises in marksmanship and driver's training had not been set

up; materials for physical training were in a neglected state; and exercises in companies and batteries began sixty to ninety minutes late because equipment and weapons were not ready. One wants to ask what kind of attitude the units and subunits should have toward these inspectors who in fact come to a unit to help eliminate, or more precisely, prevent the indicated deficiencies? And should one be surprised by the fact that this attitude at times is, to put it mildly, skeptical.

By the way, this is more than a question of the authority of all these types of commissions which, if all is to work well, must generally continue to function. The fact is that this style of activity on the part of administrative agencies undermines faith in perestroika and our ability to actually achieve decisive results in the qualitative parameters of combat readiness.

How would one interpret this fact, for example. This appeal came from district headquarters and directorates at the beginning of summer training: keep every soldier in formation and stop pulling soldiers out of combat training. But a short later and, again according to instructions from those same headquarters, soldiers (in some cases individual groups and in other cases entire subunits) are sent out to all types of work. During the first two months of summer combat drudgery, for example, personnel from Major R. Gizzatov's combat engineer subunit were actually not at planned activities for a single day. And to this day exercises are constantly being disrupted in many units and subunits in one of the major units. As the saying goes, the principle of momentary need is in effect.

I will stress that all of this is taking place after a competent commission, using critical materials that it had gathered, developed an extensive plan to eliminate shortcomings that had been detected. A group of officers headed by Colonel I. Fedorayev was set up to carry out this plan, but it achieved nothing. One of the reasons for this was that the officers from the senior headquarters again only determined the shortcomings.

For example, Colonel Fedorayev knew that none of the trainers in the artillery training area at the training center under Major V. Shakhray's responsibility had worked for some time and that many of the target elevators were in need of repair. Nonetheless nothing was done to get them working. Colonel Fedorayev also knew that many tankers had still not even completed subcaliber firing exercises during the summer period.

At division headquarters I was told, "This is how there was a blunder in planning. The headmistress was busy..."

True, this error had not occurred through the fault of the division staff. But are there other training centers in the district? Why were they not used? That would certainly have been possible if they had really had a responsible attitude toward work, been creative and raised the issue before the appropriate offices. Who could have done this

the easiest? Perhaps those same inspectors who report the state of affairs in the forces directly to the chiefs who immediately resolve this type of problem.

Yes, the authority of our comrade from the commission has clearly been shaken in the eyes of the army community. And he himself is the guilty party in this. None of those with whom I have had occasion to talk while I worked in units has any doubt about the need for monitoring. And none has yet thought of another way of accomplishing this, other than regular inspections, both general and specific, scheduled and surprise... And if they are to continue, then we have to really be concerned about the effectiveness of the inspectors' work and its return.

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Marshal Petrov on 'Dedovshchina'

*18010131 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Sep 88 p 2*

[Article by Mar SU V. Petrov: "On Friendship and Unity"]

[Text] I would like to begin with a question which in one form or another is raised in today's discussions on the problem of interrelationships that are at variance with regulations [neustavnny]. While healthy and strong traditions exist that have won the Army and Navy love and popularity among the people, why do other traditions frequently prevail in the life of some military collective and, for that matter, without beating around the bush, rotten customs that also are figured to be "at variance with regulations"?

At times this actually happens. But not everywhere and not always. It occurs where work with people is poor, where work on unifying the collective of a unit or subunit is neglected, where an attempt is made to substitute individual mass measures for tireless combat training—precisely the process in which military comradeship is formed—and where the thoughts and attitudes of the soldiers and sergeants are known, as the saying goes, in general and on the whole, but not of each personally.

It can be objected that non-regulation [neustavnny] interrelationships in the armed forces have been taken on a ubiquitous nature. No. And here I will quote an excerpt from a letter to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA from Comrade P. M. Sidelnikov, a participant in the war, who, in my opinion, accurately notes the mechanism that gives rise to such assertions. He writes that "if 'dedovshchina' [word derives from "ded," meaning grandfather, and it connotes a system of antiquated attitudes and behavior of the more senior soldiers, including abusive treatment of subordinates] has touched even one-thousandth of our subunits, the stain will fall on the entire army." Yes, if each regiment has just one such case, then it is already a lot for the armed forces. I agree that the social danger and the moral

consequences of the indicated ugly phenomenon, if repulsion in the mass consciousness is taken into account, is far more convincing than the most critical statistics. But I cannot accept speculation on this question. A majority of our regiments, companies and batteries live without interrelationships that are at variance with regulations and without "dedovshchina."

Of course, it is not correct that we gave a kind of soft, liberal designation—"interrelationships at variance with regulations"—to the grossest distortion of the principles of combat fraternity. When, disregarding the laws of military service, individual servicemen, joining on a corrupt basis, establish groups of hooligans and rowdies and intimidate soldiers who are morally and physically poorly prepared, this represents not only relations at variance with regulations and not only a violation of military discipline, but it is a real crime. And the criminals have to be severely punished. Naturally, in accordance with the law.

Nevertheless: who should be their first and merciless judge? In the nation it is the people, and in the armed forces, the soldiers and sergeants themselves. They should not tolerate barracks hooliganism, and they should not be afraid to talk openly about this in a soldier's collective and to report to their commanders. The sergeants and master sergeants should play the dominant role here. If they are trained well and united and rely on honorable soldiers who are their seniors and on Komsomol members, then not one of even the most inveterate hooligans can stand up against such a force.

A special subject—about senior soldiers. Those of them who take the path of mocking their colleagues, attempting, figuratively speaking, to use someone else's hands to clean a floor they themselves have dirtied, those who malinger, who shun honorable service, and who assume "dedovstvo" for themselves, deserve nothing other than universal contempt and punishment. By the way, these "dedy" [old fogies] look contemptible and laughable in comparison, let us say, with soldiers who served after the war for 6 to 7 years.

Unfortunately, part of the youth comes to the armed forces with an already formed aspiration to live at someone else's expense and to hold sway in hooligan and immoral company. This is our common failing, a flaw in the work and moral upbringing of youth, but often, even of their fathers and mothers.

Nevertheless, as they used to say back in the days of the Russian army, we value the "old" soldier. But not those who abusively, like a vulture, seek a prey among the weak. And even the soldiers with long service, I think, would not agree that they are all stricken with "dedovshchina." The experienced soldier who has been under fire, who knows the beauty of life and who faced death more than once, who is covered with wounds, who has walked half the earth and who endured cold and hunger, never said: I have waged war enough, brother, now I will sit a

little, and you go and attack. Thoughtfully, in a friendly way, and frequently in a fatherly way, he passed on his experience to the young soldiers, and he not only taught, but he also enticed them into battle by his personal example. That is the way it was in the war.

And in peacetime we know a lot of examples where soldiers of the older callups are first-rate support to commanders, and they take on the execution of the most complicated tasks. Their motto with respect to the young soldiers is "do not do it for me," but "do it as I do it." Of course, even the memory about such as these remains good. I will say about myself personally: having started service as a cadet private in a regimental school and having gone through all of the duty positions and military ranks, I still remember Sergeant Bychkov, my squad commander, and Senior Lieutenant Galim Khadzhiyev, the first commander of the platoon.

It is impossible to defend the motherland alone. One must remember well that modern wars are conducted by nations and are prepared long before their beginning, and that victory also is forged earlier, in peacetime. And in our daily and difficult work, we must in every way possible strengthen combat friendship, whose sources in our multinational country lie in the friendship of the peoples of the USSR. To disrupt this friendship means to act in the interests of our enemies.

In this connection, I welcome the good beginning of the soldiers of the "Nth" guards motorized rifle unit who in their letter to the USSR Minister of Defense assured him of their full resolve not to allow "dedovshchina" in their ranks.

13052

Yazov Red Square Speech on Anniversary of Revolution, 1988

*LD0711084088 Moscow Television Service in Russian
0710 GMT 7 Nov 88*

[Speech by Army General Dmitriy Yazov at Moscow Red Square festivities marking the 71st anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution—live]

[Text] Comrade servicemen of the Soviet Armed Forces! Working people of the Soviet Union! Esteemed foreign guests! On behalf of and on the instructions of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Soviet Government I greet you and congratulate you on the holiday of all people, the 71st anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution!

The greatness of those historic days when the working class and the working people of Russia, under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, took power into their own hands and began the building of socialism, is being revealed ever more fully in our day. What has been done by many generations of Soviet people following the victory of the Great October Revolution comprises the foundation for the successful implementation of the restructuring of socialist society.

The course mapped out by the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th all-union party conference is being implemented consistently. The Soviet Union today is at a crucial stage in its socioeconomic development, one that is of enormous importance for the country's destiny. The moral and political climate in society is changing. The process of making the economy more healthy and turning it toward improving by every means the working people's living conditions has begun. Restructuring has become the practical cause of millions of Soviet people.

The new political thinking, which stems from the priority of interests common to all mankind, the efforts of the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries aimed at preventing war, both nuclear and conventional, and the reduction of military potentials to the limits of reasonable sufficiency, is finding increasing understanding and support among the world public and the leaders of many states.

The stereotypes of anti-Sovietism and groundless conjecturing as to a Soviet military threat are being gradually destroyed. A start has been made on real nuclear disarmament and the settlement in practice of regional conflicts. At the same time progressive tendencies in worldwide development and the process of reducing tension and of disarmament have not yet become irreversible. The destruction of medium- and shorter-range missiles has only been begun as yet, and already there are calls going out, and of various types, for the compensation, modernization and building up conventional arms, and speeding up the Star Wars program. All of this is being

assessed and taken into account in due fashion by the Communist Party and Soviet Government when working out policy in the sphere of defense and the country's security.

The efficiency of Soviet defense construction is predominantly guaranteed by parameters of quality. It is conducted in strict accordance with our defense doctrine and the principle of reasonable sufficiency. Within the Soviet Army and Navy, as throughout the entire country, the restructuring process is becoming more profound. Combat readiness is being raised, the skill of the personnel improved, discipline and order strengthened. We have all the essentials for the defense of the homeland: first-class equipment and armaments, rich combat experience, splendid people. Soviet servicemen are fulfilling their patriotic and internationalist duty in united rank with the servicemen of the fraternal armies of the countries of the Warsaw Pact. True to the ideas of October, the cause of the great Lenin, and the new course of the CPSU, the Soviet Armed Forces are maintaining a reliable watch over the peaceful labor and the socialist gains of the Soviet people. Hurrah! [troops respond with "hurrah"]

Betekhtin, Kapitanets Promoted

*LD0411195788 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1800 GMT 4 Nov 88*

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has decreed the following military promotions: Colonel General Anatoliy Vladimirovich Betekhtin, to Army General; Admiral Ivan Matveyevich Kapitanets, to Admiral of the Fleet. [video shows still pictures of the two officers]

All-Army Conference on Technical Innovation in Moscow

*18010229 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Oct 88 First Edition p 1*

[Article by Lt Col V. Baberdin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Innovators Talk Things Over. All-Army Conference of Inventors and Efficiency Experts Began Work in Moscow Yesterday"]

[Text] Innovators of the Army and Navy have waited a long time for this event, which is being conducted within the framework of the Ministry of Defense for the first time. They waited with impatience and hope, and they waited and prepared for it thoroughly. Phone calls to the editorial office, letters of readers of this newspaper, and discussions within the circle of innovators and organizers of technical work attest to one thing: an all-Army conference is necessary, it is urgent, and it is being held at an appropriate time.

Inventors and efficiency experts [ratsionalizator] from various military districts, groups of forces, fleets, central and main directorates, schools, academies and NII's

have assembled in Moscow in order to conduct a motivated and open discussion about ways of restructuring invention organs in their activity and work, to express themselves on what troubles them, and to examine problems of the organization of technical creativity.

For it, technical creativity, has always been an important resource for increasing the combat readiness of units and ships. At the present stage—a stage of fundamental restructuring of the armed forces—it is given special attention. And this is understandable. Without the aggressive creative activity of an army of thousands of innovators today, it is impossible to achieve a consistent implementation of the aims of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, and for us the most important of these is the orientation of defense construction chiefly along qualitative parameters.

And the fact that military inventors and efficiency experts can render their weighty utterances and are ready to bring competition into subunits, NII's, and design and technological departments of industrial enterprises has already been demonstrated in practice. The central exhibition of the work of innovators, which is being displayed right here in the foyer of the Moscow Military District officers' club, is a striking illustration of this.

The exhibition is not large, but it is extremely interesting, and the selections for it were very strict. Only the very, very best exhibits are included. When you familiarize yourself with them, you become convinced once again—yes, military skilled craftsman can do a lot when they are supported in their jobs, are given help, or at least are not interfered with.

This is the first day of the conference. It was opened by Army Gen P. Lushev, first deputy minister of defense. Army Gen V. Shabanov, deputy minister of defense, presented a report. There was a lively discussion of the report. And not just during the plenary sessions, but also during breaks between them, and during dinnertime and free evening hours. Each of the participants is ready to lay out his program of cardinal restructuring in the organization of inventions work. Each is filled with bold ideas and non-typical solutions. So, in truth, this is a forum of innovators, and you will not find anyone who is indifferent here.

The conference will last 3 days.

13052

Mobile Battery Group Used To Simulate Large Artillery Group

18010220 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Oct 88 p 1

[Article by Lt. Col. V. Kamotskiy: "From Temporary Firing Positions"]

[Text] The battalion commander invited Capt. A. Danshin to the map.

—"The plan is to create a dummy artillery grouping", he told the battalion commander. "It will be your job to give it some plausibility. The battery under your command will be a roving one..."

The battalion commander indicated the region for preparing the dummy position and defined the most important "enemy" targets and the methods of delivering fire. Danshin transferred the action chart to his working map and noted down the signals for coordination...

He knew that the assigned mission required the subunit's continuous fire mobility and maximum coordination. Experience from the Great Patriotic War and battles in Afghanistan had more than once confirmed the high effectiveness of roving artillery subunits. When ably organized, their actions often proved decisive in achieving victory over a superior enemy. In April 1945, for example, after the softening up of the defense at the Neisse river, our mobile formations were moved into a breakthrough gap. A gun battery was assigned to the tank brigade. The artillermen had to change firing positions several times, creating the appearance of a significant grouping. The battery commander showed resourcefulness in selecting the route and regions of fire. The artillermen ably supported the actions of the brigade's forward detachment. Despite the fact that the enemy had converted one built-up area into a kind of inaccessible fortress, the brigade's forward detachment captured it successfully and the mission was accomplished with minimal losses.

Losing no time, Danshin summoned the senior battery officer, the platoon leaders, and gun chiefs and briefed them on the coming combat training work. Each fire mission had to be executed from a new fire position. The time allotted for movement and data preparation was extremely short.

Senior Lt. V. Rodnonov headed the artillery reconnaissance team. It had to prepare several temporary fire positions, advancing along the route.

Senior topogeodetic operator Sgt. A. Surovtsev never tore his eyes away from the readings on the course plotter. As the vehicle moved, the route line was clearly indicated on the map secured to the instrument drum ... The vehicle stopped several hundred meters before the planned fire position. Privates B. Shayvakov and S. Karpenko were sent out to reconnoiter, dressed in their

chemical protection gear. They discovered that the terrain was not contaminated or mined. Senior Lt. Rodnov brought the vehicle to the site, from which the crest clearance angles could be precisely measured. Calculations confirmed the correctness of the position choice. The artillery survey was carried out. The commander of the reconnaissance team determined the grid azimuths and oriented the sight on the command vehicle. The sites for the guns on the indicated battery front were staked out. Then they moved on. There was an equally painstaking survey of the next firing position. While the reconnaissance team was doing this work, the gun crew members prepared the self-propelled artillery pieces for fire. The crew chiefs adjusted the sights and the mechanic-drivers topped off the fuel tanks and checked the undercarriage of the combat vehicles.

Work was in full swing at the command-observation post. Headquarters platoon leader Lt. D. Volosevich and his men prepared two OPs. The reconnaissance troops determined the target range and azimuth settings from each of them.

It is no accident that I have described the procedures for combat training measures of a roving battery in such detail. Thorough preparation is ninety percent of future success.

Reconnaissance reported the "enemy" advance. By this point the self-propelled pieces had already taken their places at the first temporary position. A river blocked the path of the attackers. A bridge was the only means of effective crossing. But Capt. Danshin had prepared the computed fire settings for precisely this bridge. When the "enemy" battalion was still more than a kilometer from the bridge, the command to open fire arrived from the OP. A mighty salvo resounded within mere seconds, after which the guns continued to thunder. The battery was delivering volley fire.

The artillermen not only disrupted the river crossing with their fire, they also forced the "enemy" to deploy prematurely to a combat formation.

A round exploded not far from the firing position. The "enemy" had started firing for adjustment. It was time to move. The first and fourth crews left behind models of their guns and covered them with specially produced camouflage means. The artillermen left several explosive packs, gunfire simulators, at the site of the second and third howitzers.

They began exploding. The "enemy" detached part of its assets to suppress the dummy fire position. But meanwhile the battery had already moved to another previously prepared region. Again a fire storm rained down on the "enemy". Scarcely was he able to collect himself when the battery was pulled from its place and moved by the planned route to the next FP. Now finally the "enemy" believed in the reality of the artillery group. He was forced to concentrate a large part of his weapon

assets to suppress it. And in this way ... helped the reconnaissance to get a fix on his weapon positions. Their coordinates were entered on Danshin's working map.

"The primary position within the battalion was the final point of movement of the battery..."

13423

Ground Forces React to Protectionism Scandal in Suvorov School

Leningrad Garrison Staff Judge Advocate's Office
18010211a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Aug 88 Second Edition p 1

[Letter by Col Justice O. Khupin]

[Text] The Leningrad Garrison staff judge advocate's office completed a staff judge advocate's inspection of facts set forth in the article entitled "A Moral Choice" published 30 January 1988. The inspection confirmed instances of appointed persons and individual citizens asking the command element of the Leningrad Suvorov Military School to assist a number of graduating students in entering the school, of abuse of office, and of a violation of the procedure for taking exams.

Because of the infractions of legality School Commandant Maj Gen Konstantinov and officers Shlinchak and Uzyumov were warned about the inadmissibility of violating the law. Institution of criminal proceedings against them was rejected.

Other questions not relating to the competence of the staff judge advocate's office were checked by representatives of the higher command element and political bodies, about which they will inform the editors.

Deputy Chief of Ground Forces Military Educational Institutions
18010211a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Aug 88 Second Edition p 1

[Letter by Lt Gen I. Studenikin]

[Text] I inform you that the article "A Moral Choice" was carefully studied by staff personnel of the Ground Forces Military Educational Institutions Directorate and discussed at an expanded session of the party bureau with the participation of the secretary of the party commission of the Ground Forces Political Directorate.

The facts of a gross infraction of rules for acceptance and of protectionism occurred. Three officers immediately guilty of this were given party and administrative punishment.

Along with other facts, it was established during a comprehensive study of the state of affairs at the school that Maj Gen V. V. Konstantinov and former Political Department Chief Col V. M. Kovalev did not make a party evaluation of the gross infractions of the procedure of conducting exams, did not take timely steps to punish guilty parties, and did not report through channels. This made it possible for Personnel Section Chief Maj V. M. Shlinchak and former Leningrad Military District Military Educational Institutions Department Chief Col V. G. Kozlov to exert pressure on Capt L. V. Novikov and Lt Col N. I. Anokhin, who had spoken out against protectionism in the school.

The gross infractions of the procedure for filling up the school also were facilitated by an absence of proper supervision on the part of former Leningrad Military District Deputy Commander for Civilian Military Training and Military Educational Institutions Lt Gen Ye. A. Suvalov.

The CIC of the Ground Forces gave Maj Gen V. V. Konstantinov a severe reprimand for omissions in work with officer-instructor personnel and for serious violations committed in filling up the school's first course in 1987.

Lt Col I. P. Dovgalenko, Lt Col V. A. Uzyumov and Maj V. M. Shlinchak were removed from their positions and assigned to lower positions for gross violations of requirements of the USSR Minister of Defense order and for abuses of official position.

Steps are being taken to normalize the moral atmosphere in the school. Capt S. V. Kozlov and Capt O. Ye. Ger have been relieved of their positions and placed on troop duty. The lessons and conclusions stemming from the item published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA have been made known to the heads of all Suvorov military schools.

A revision of the USSR Council of Ministers Decree "Suvorov Military Schools, the Nakhimov Naval School and the Military Music School" is planned for 1989. It will define more clearly the purposes of these schools and the procedure for filling them and allocating graduates.

6904

Obsolescence in Volga MD Motor Vehicle Park
18010211b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Aug 88 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Lt Col Justice V. Kleshchev, Volga Military District: "An Acute Signal: Stored Too Long"]

[Text] I will stipulate right away that the state of affairs in the unit of which I will speak previously caused no concern. And even now outwardly everything seemed to be well during work there by representatives of the

district staff judge advocate's office. In inspecting office, living, housekeeping and other spaces, we saw that they were being kept in good condition.

That was also the appearance of the motor vehicle park where equipment in storage was concentrated. But Capt I. Leskov, who familiarized us with the park, suggested that we turn attention to the "extreme" old age of the vehicles. It turned out that the majority of them had been in storage for 15-20 years. Industry long ago stopped putting out motor vehicles of this type and consequently there was an absence of spare parts for them, so that there is no need to speak of the equipment's combat readiness.

Other deficiencies also were uncovered in the course of the inspection. Vehicles with special-fuel tanks assigned to them are stored in the motor vehicle park. These vehicles are serviced separately from the tanks during periodic technical servicing. As a result, for example, the electrical equipment of vehicles and tanks is not mated.

Just why did it come down to this in the unit? The fact is that the motor transport service is responsible only for the safekeeping of vehicles, and the fuels and lubricants service is responsible for the safekeeping of tanks. It would be possible, for example, to write off vehicles which had served their period according to the established procedure, but in accordance with guidance documents motor vehicles can be written off only if the tanks are written off, and the tanks are in superb condition!

People in the appropriate directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense were informed long ago of the existing situation. It was two years ago that they allegedly even intended to prepare a document writing off equipment that had become obsolete long ago, but they apparently forgot.

When I told Col M. Robak, chief of the district fuels and lubricants service, about everything I saw in the unit where Capt Leskov serves he immediately sent a new report off to the Ministry of Defense, particularly to Lt Gen V. Blokhin, but he himself doubted that the matter would be resolved quickly. It turns out that according to existing rules a separate document is drawn up for writing off each piece of equipment and the right to approve it belongs to the deputy district commander for rear. No one in the district has the right to draw up such documents in large numbers.

Is this not strange? The fact is that in our case the equipment is no longer combat-ready and the unit already has been "laid bare." Not acknowledging this means becoming like an ostrich who has hidden his head in the sand in hopes of not being noticed.

Tank Configurations

81442998 Moscow TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE
in Russian May 88 pp 4-5


[Article by Col. B. Safonov: "Tank Configurations"]

[Text] In the plans for military preparations being drawn up by countries that are participants in the aggressive NATO block, special importance is attached to improvement of tanks—a principal weapon of ground forces. This effort has two goals: modernization of existing tank designs and the creation of new models. In this connection, work is in progress to improve all tank combat characteristics, primarily firepower, degree of protection against a variety of combat threats, and mobility. Foreign experts stress that with the rapid growth in number and effectiveness of antitank weapons taking place, the problem of protection improvement has assumed a position of prime importance.

Attempts at providing the required level of protection from modern high-velocity and shaped-charge projectiles have resulted in weight increases—to 55-65 tons—of third generation main battle tanks adopted in the early 1980s: the M-1 (USA), Leopard 2 (FRG), and the Challenger (England). Experts warn that the new projectiles will necessitate further increase in protection levels, undoubtedly leading to larger tank weights, thus exerting a negative influence on satisfaction of requirements related to mobility. This is one of the reasons why tank designers are devoting greater attention to developing more efficient configurations, i.e., to particular positions of tank assemblies and crew stations. Typical in the case of modern tanks is the so-called classical configuration, whereby the main gun is located in a rotating turret, with the engine and transmission in the rear and the crew in another location.

Foreign experts are of the opinion that the above configuration offers relatively efficient placement of the crew, thus affording convenience in handling the gun; all-round observation from the highest point of the vehicle; all-round fire from the tank; and ease of removal, replacement, and servicing of the engine-transmission unit. These advantages have contributed to the wide popularity of this layout. The above configuration is not entirely free of disadvantages. The most serious are the high vehicle silhouette, which is associated with the need to provide a standing operational environment for the loader, and the large size of the turret. The difficulties encountered in providing reliable protection are largely predetermined by locating the crew in different places.

In their search for new configurations, foreign designers are attempting to diminish the armored volume, particularly the inhabited compartments—the fighting and driver's—since it is they that must be protected by means of fitting thicker and heavier armor.



Crewless tank (in foreground) being operated by commands transmitted from crew-operated combat vehicle

The fighting compartment volume is largely determined by the size of the main armament and disposition of ammunition load. Alternatives to the traditional configuration include placing the main armament inside the hull—the casemate solution—or locating it outside the armored volume—the external solution. These approaches make it possible to effect considerable reduction in tank armored volume, with the attendant advantages of a lower silhouette and lighter weight.

The experts also feel that the above does not exhaust the possibilities of further improvement in this configuration. Thus, the fighting compartment volume can be made smaller by fitting an automatic loading system for the main gun and cutting the crew size from four to three. This would make it possible to lower the turret somewhat. However, the crew locations are only one factor in determining the turret height. Another is the requirement for large gun depression angles (to -10°). For this reason, foreign designers are searching for solutions whereby the gun breech at large depression angles can rise above the turret roof. A radical solution is locating the main gun externally, either partially or completely.

Variants of a low-silhouette turret for two (tank commander and gunner) or for one (gunner), with the main gun and automatic loader partially external, are under development by American designers (see illustrations).


In the first case, weight savings are attained by decreasing the armored volume, since the tank commander and gunner are located on one level, not two. An advantage in this regard, according to the designers, is the possibility of retaining a relatively simple fire control system.

In the case of the single-station turret, the commander is located in the hull next to the driver (not in the turret). Although this makes it possible for the turret to be considerably smaller, a fairly difficult problem surfaces—a requirement for all-round observation by the commander. Attempts to resolve this problem involve optical rotating contact devices, television equipment, and thermal-imaging devices. However, difficulties of designing this kind of observation system relate to large losses of light in the day vision channel in transmitting the images from the turret to the hull via the contact device and relatively short range of television and thermal-imaging apparatus.

Work carried out to modernize the West German tank included an approach to fighting compartment design whereby the tank commander and gunner would be located in a low-silhouette turret (in an armored section to the left of the gun). The turret rear containing the automatic loader and mechanical ammunition stowage is rotated vertically relative to the trunnions by a special hydraulic drive, thus permitting firing a stabilized gun while in motion. It is thought that this turret configuration makes it possible to provide sufficient protection for the tank commander and gunner, with the added advantages of a flatter silhouette and lower weight.

Improvement in tank design is also being sought in the traditional layout. For example, foreign designers point out that mounting the engine transversely instead of longitudinally results in shortening the hull length by one meter, with the advantage thus gained applicable to providing greater protection.

Work is in progress to design turret-type tanks in which the engine and transmission compartment is located in front. This arrangement is found in the Israeli Merkava, which has been employed in combat. Switzerland has developed a prototype main battle tank featuring an engine-transmission compartment located in front and a two-place low-silhouette turret mounting a 120mm



Tank configurations: (a) turretlss tank with external armament mounted on rotating pedestal equipped with mechanical ammunition loader; (b) articulated tank with armament and ammunition located in forward module; engine-transmission assembly and additional ammunition are in rear module

smoothbore gun and automatic loader. Research is being carried out in the FRG on a front-drive chassis intended for a family of combat vehicles.

The concept of locating the engine and transmission in front pursues three major objectives: co-location of the engine-transmission compartment and driver's compartment, thus diminishing the total armored volume; utilization of the engine-transmission assembly in front as additional crew protection from antitank weapons; freeing up space in the stern, thus permitting additional ammunition storage and providing greater ease for the crew to enter and exit through a large stern hatch. However, foreign experts see serious shortcomings in the above design. Thus, this arrangement complicates engine and transmission replacement, especially in the field; it reduces accessibility of assemblies for servicing and repair; and it renders the engine and transmission more vulnerable to antitank fire.

The requirement to supply air to the engine and expel exhaust gases entails serious difficulties in designing armor protection for the tank crew.

By eliminating the turret and mounting the armament rigidly in the hull, Swedish designers have created a very compact tank. However, it is pointed out that in spite of numerous new technical solutions applied in the design (duplicating the critical components, placing the fuel and

ammunition outside the inhabited compartment, and others), the tank suffers a substantial disadvantage—the gun can be fired effectively only while stationary. This shortcoming has hindered wide-scale adoption of this design.

The above concept inspired the FRG design of experimental models in which the main armament—two 105mm or 120mm tank guns—was mounted above the tracks. The gun was operated in elevation by special drives, while azimuth was set by rotating the vehicle proper. It was the designers' intent to raise the kill probability by firing both guns simultaneously. However, specialists are doubtful that a vehicle of the casemate armament type can become as universal as the traditional main battle tank, due to the enormous difficulties associated with firing while in motion.

Most foreign experts believe that tank employment in combat even in the future will require the crew to conduct observation and fire in directions other than that in which the vehicle is moving. For this reason, consideration is being given in many countries to future designs in which the main armament is located on a rotating or elevating mount located on the hull roof. Advantages of this design include lower weight and smaller size of the vehicle. If the vehicle is firing from behind partial cover, the enemy sees a very small target




Illustration on right: Low-silhouette tank with three-man crew. The automatic loader is located in a turret recess; the engine-transmission compartment is in the rear. This design features armor-protected additional ammunition stowage in the vehicle extreme rear instead of in turret.

that is difficult to hit. Even if a hit is scored, the damage is to the armament; the crew, located in the hull, will not be put out of action.

In the foreign designs, the battlefield is viewed by means of roof-mounted observation devices which have serious blind spots. This is considered to be a substantial disadvantage. It is planned to resolve this problem by using optico-electronic observation systems in which the instrument heads are located externally. However, at the present time these systems are believed to be too complex and expensive, without satisfying completely the requirements made of them.

In general, in summing up the external armament tank design, experts consider it to be worthy of development in spite of the serious limitations: impossibility of manual loading; difficulty in eliminating armament malfunctions without exiting; need for employing complex all-round observation devices; and substantially poorer

armament protection. Some countries are assessing the possibility of improving survivability of tanks, especially of crews, by designing so-called articulated vehicles, where the useful armored volumes are distributed into two flexibly-connected modules, with each possessing a certain amount of independence. A typical example of this kind of vehicle is a working model developed in Sweden. This model incorporates new technical solutions, such as a 120mm smoothbore gun fitted on a light (20t) armored vehicle, and new driving methods.

In the opinion of foreign experts, the future holds the distinct possibility of crewless tanks operated by commands transmitted from special control tanks. This can become a reality only if a reliable and jam-free system can be successfully designed to exchange data between the control and the combat vehicles.

Thus, in the view of Western developers, the creation of effective combat vehicles capable of accomplishing their assigned missions is associated with the need to resolve a number of difficult technical problems. The most important are: all-round observation from the highest point on the vehicle; satisfactory fire accuracy in gun remote

control operation; reliable automatic loading, in which the round is supplied from the hull or from a special stowage arrangement, through an open and unprotected space.

13005

CINC, PVO Comments on Missile Units' Readiness
PM1711110588 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Nov 88 First Edition p 1

[Commentary by Army General I. Tretyak, commander in chief of the Air Defense Forces, on skill competitions among Air Defense missile units under the general heading: "Combat Training: Quality and Efficiency; 180 Seconds of Dueling Decided Who Would be the Best in the Air Defense Missile Troops"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The competitions showed the degree of combat readiness of our air defense missile units. If we are talking about firing, it was distinguished by its rapidity. The targets were hit, but I can see problems behind the missilemen's skill. For example, all firing is now conducted under jamming conditions, and this is correct: The enemy will not allow himself to be shot down so easily. But those who have set up the jamming are on the ground. I think, as a rule, that they should be set up in drones. This would be closer to real conditions.

Another aspect of the work: Equipment with automated systems has stopped many from analyzing the situation and making decisions independently. But everything is possible in a real battle. Why do officers get lost administratively if they do not have their computer "nannies"? Primarily because many of them do not have sound experience. They did not have time to get it because they moved too quickly up the service ladder. I am not in favor of holding back this growth, but it must not occur to the detriment of the work. During training sessions the commanders "got stuck" when it came to identifying targets.

A positive factor is that divisions and regiments can go straight out to the training center and immediately start missile firing. Our defense doctrine dictates a high level of readiness. It has managed, albeit not completely, to break the habit of shilly-shallying, and predictable routines. But this does not come easily. They carried on in the same old way here too, during the competitions. They decided to fire at ground targets, but they did not prepare for this well. The target situation was methodologically wrong. For this kind of reason even the most interesting work can be ruined. They will have to work and think properly.

The people were thanked and congratulated on their triumph. Everything was cordial and informal. But I couldn't help thinking: Why shouldn't participation in such important events be reflected in the officer's certification? But we limit ourselves to official jargon: He knows the equipment, we say.... We need to think about posterity. Some officer symbols need to be introduced so that our sons and grandsons have a souvenir as testimony of military prowess.

The contests are an active form of competition. It is successful, but the best way to propagandize the experience gained should not be forgotten. The victor's order is not to hide his experience but to pass it on, considering it an honor if it takes root. The common cause only stands to gain from this.

In a word, the competition brought to light a number of problems which we shall resolve.

PVO Units Short of Radar Specialists
18010226 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Oct 88 First Edition pp 1-2

[Article by Lt Col V. Burdin and Capt A. Galunov: "Rented Specialists: Why All-Star Teams, Not Regular Contingents, Go to the Firing Range"]

[Text] The training mission of the anti-aircraft rocket battalion under Lieutenant Colonel V. Miroshnikov's command was coming to an end; suddenly, target designation ceased. The commanding officer tried to contact the intelligence and target designation radar station. There was no answer. He tried once more. It seemed that the engagement with the airborne "enemy" was lost: the target was leaving the battalion's range. Only at that moment did the voice of Captain A. Dolbin return.

The rocket soldiers should be given their due: they did not miss the opportunity and were able to make the practice launch. But the incident became an object of a thorough investigation.

What happened? Private First Class N. Pechelyulko, who was operating the altimeter, lost concentration. Dolbin did not cover for him in time. As a result, the soldiers not only failed to meet their own performance standard but hurt their comrades as well.

"With such speed of information transmission, it would be hard to expect successful firing," summed an officer of the superior staff Lieutenant Colonel Sh. Akhmetzhanov: the results of the training mission.

It is well-known that in the duel with the airborne "enemy" the skill of highly trained professionals effecting the launch—i.e. equipment and launcher operators—is a determining factor. Yet, the skill of those who help rocket troops see the "enemy" in advance, penetrate his design and make the right decision is just as important—and at times, even more so. In this case, we are talking about the commander of a radar reconnaissance station Captain Dolbin and his subordinates. As it turned out, the officer did not act confidently in a difficult situation. This happened primarily because he was not a complete expert in the equipment he was entrusted to operate. Why? He missed a great deal during the preparation to this important training mission. Yet, it should also be noted that Captain Dolbin was not trained to operate

such equipment either at the officers' school or in his previous position. The time spent in the new assignment was not enough to make him an expert.

How did it happen, then, that a man who was not an expert in the technology was given such a responsible job? The problem is that the unit suffers from an acute shortage of such specialists. Radiotechnical schools that train them send them primarily to the radiotechnical troops. At least this is the impression one gets studying the situation at this one and some other units in our combined unit. This is why commanding officers must often pick radar unit commanders from among officers in other positions. This practice took hold a long time ago and has become, in effect, the norm. For instance, we were told by a cadre unit officer S.Kovtun that some 70 percent of officers in such positions never studied the subject at the officers' school but learned it in their units. The very same Capital Dolbin, whenever he needed advice, often turned to radar commanders in the vicinity. As to one Senior Lieutenant I.Baboshin, before becoming a reconnaissance officer, he commanded a launch platoon.

A strange state of affairs arises, whereby specialists on whose work so much rides in combat situation lack sufficient professional training. Yet, combined units tolerate it quite calmly, which is proven by the fact that they have not yet set up an organized system to train and prepare such specialists. The very same Lieutenant Colonel Akhmetzyanov had advised rocket soldiers to turn their attention to this problem. In particular, he suggested that Captain Dolbin's superiors set exact goals for his professional growth and monitor periodically how those goals are being attained. Yet, as the poet said, the load remains in place. As a result, incidents similar to the one described at the beginning of this article are frequent at that unit even at important training missions.

Yet, however important, a training mission is, in essence, a practice. Mistakes are acceptable there. But what will the soldiers do in a similar situation at a mock combat exercise?

As to the battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Miroshnikov's command, it has not yet taken part in a range exercise. One hopes that they still have time to implement Lieutenant Colonel Akhmetzyanov's advice. As to some other units, they are already past that stage.

Instead of raising the standards and effectiveness of training, some units chose a different route. To assist weaker specialists, stronger ones were borrowed from other units. What kind of a solution is this? It is nothing short of deceit. The staff of the unit where Lieutenant Colonel A.Linnik serves should have known this. Senior Lieutenant Yukhalin joined the soldiers at the range and operated their reconnaissance equipment. He is a first-class specialist and knows the equipment perfectly, every last bolt of it as they say in such cases. Mind you, this fact is not reason enough for an officer to help provide

support for a firing exercise of another unit. The party organization, however, also maintained silence on this issue. As a result, the main goal—to score high marks—was achieved by the rocket unit. Meanwhile, no one gave it a thought that high marks received in such a way corrupt people and teach them to make deals with their own conscience.

Sadly, it must be admitted that the practice of inviting "outsiders" to carry out combat missions at the range becomes more and more widespread. Not only specialists that are in short supply are invited, but diesel motor operators, rocket fuel specialists and specialists of other common professions are, as well. Here is an example. Fuel specialist Senior Lieutenant L.Kotov, diesel and electric system specialists Privates V.Sinkorenko and A.Ivanchenko, signal specialists Sergeants K.Bobovkin and S.Baklanov spent more than 2 months away from their units. It turned out that they were indispensable to the unit where Lieutenant Colonel L.Gerasimov serves during its range exercises. The unit accomplished its mission successfully. Yet, why did it need to make that switch? The unit has plenty of its own rocket fuel and diesel specialists.

Unfortunately, the explanation is simple. While the unit that used Senior Lieutenant Yukhalin did so out of desperation, this unit actually planned the substitutions. It had nothing to hope for, since its training missions with its own specialists had failed repeatedly throughout the academic year, while those that had succeeded were staged at an inadequate methodological level and did not offer a requisite number of tactical tasks, emergency situations and complex problems. Instruction on a one-to-one basis was rare. All this invariably affected specialists' competence level. As to the substitutions, there were motivated, just as in the former case, by the desire to score high marks for the collective.

Well, the point of view of those who go around begging for specialists is pretty much clear, even though they can hardly be excused. But what about those who lend them? How do unit commanders solve their own problems, given that every soldier in a unit is indispensable?

The feelings of Major A.Sheludyakov, chief of staff of the rocket battalion that had lent Senior Lieutenant Kotov, were unambiguous: he condemns the practice. It impacts negatively on training and, most important, creates added difficulties in carrying out military duty: those who stay behind must perform their own duties and cover for those who are away.

"But we must execute orders from above," sighed the officer.

Lieutenant Colonel V.Kudelya has a different opinion.

"The problem of 'Varangians' does exist," he agreed. "Yet, at times, it is unavoidable. Take for instance the case of Senior Lieutenant Yukhalin. Reconnaissance

equipment at the range is somewhat different from that which is used by the unit where Lieutenant Colonel Linnik serves. Our Yukhalin knows it as no one else. This is why we did a favor to our comrades."

As you see, the officers' points of view diverge. True, at the range reconnaissance equipment may turn out to be somewhat different. Yet, if Lieutenant Colonel Kudelya has this kind of equipment, would it not be easier to send weak specialists to his unit to learn on it?

We mentioned this at the superior staff. Our idea did not catch on immediately. In particular, Colonel M.Osipenko also blamed the differences between the units' equipment and that used at the range. This is the reason, he said, that some commanders must invite well-trained specialists for assistance. When we insisted that what we were talking about was no simple assistance but indulgence and blatant deceit, Colonel Osipenko at last acknowledged that it was a relapse of the old disease of the rocket troops, one that was born of the period of stagnation.

"But I do not think that we can not cure it on our own," he concluded thoughtfully. "Even at a combined unit level, to train high-level professionals, universal specialists in reconnaissance equipment able to operate different types of equipment equally well, is impossible without an appropriate foundation. Yet on a ministry level, this question is not being addressed as comprehensively as we would like."

Naturally, this problem can not be resolved by spontaneous action. Solid material and technical support and a well thought-out training methodology are required. Yet, to classify a problem as a difficult one may actually be a way of avoiding it, pushing the disease deeper into the body. To train such specialists at a unit level is, naturally, a difficult task. Instead, many in the military suggest that it would be useful to create departments at

radiotechnical schools especially geared to train reconnaissance specialists for anti-aircraft rocket troops. Currently, as mentioned earlier, such specialists are sent into anti-aircraft troops without taking into account the true needs for such specialists, often simply by a gentlemen's agreement between two commanding officers swapping a fuel specialist for a reconnaissance specialist. This inevitably causes additional difficulties in the task of training such specialists. Upgrading their skill level is the responsibility of the radiotechnical troops. Hence, without an a priori agreement, a commanding officer in the anti-aircraft rocket troops technically can not send a reconnaissance officer to be trained, even though it is being done sometimes.

But excuses are only partially acceptable, but no more than that.

"In theory, the training of such specialists can be done at a combined unit level," believes the unit's staff officer Colonel I.Zabelin.

Lieutenant Colonel Akhmetzyanov and other officers share this view. They propose to conduct training in the form of rocket artillery conferences, during trips to other units to share experience or by other appropriate means. This is not just wishful thinking. Something like this has been implemented at a number of places. For instance, before going to the latest exercise, the reconnaissance crew of the unit where Lieutenant Colonel I.Antonovich serves spent some time at a radar battalion. Rocket soldiers accomplished their mission at the range successfully. The same training technique was adopted by the crew of the battalion under Captain G.Fedorov's command.

It turns out, then, that when there is a will, there is a way to accomplish exercise missions without any "Varangians". All one needs is to reject stereotypes and resist the temptation to take the path of least resistance. Then perhaps one could start getting satisfaction from a successful range exercise.

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Career of Designer of First Soviet Atomic Submarine Reviewed
18010137 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Oct 88 p 4

[Article by Ret. Capt Lt Yu. Stvolinskiy, honored cultural worker of the RSFSR, under the rubric "In the Annals of the Fatherland." "Designer of the Nuclear Submarine"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb in August 1949 and its first hydrogen bomb in 1953. We went our own way in developing the country's defensive might. We were not striving forward but neither could we allow ourselves to fall behind. Having caught up with the United States in the development and production of nuclear weapons, we could not allow them to take a big lead in the creation of the means of delivering them. In the mid-1950's, the Americans built the first nuclear-powered submarine. At the end of the 1950's, the first Soviet nuclear submarine was launched and subsequently it was given the name "Leninskiy Komsomol." The nuclear submarine embodied the highest achievements of Soviet science and technology of that time. And it was designed by the sailor Engr-Capt 1st Rank V. Peregudov.

Great People Without Family Names

The builders of defensive technology have a special fate. The poet Robert Rozhdestvenskiy called them "great people without family names."

The name of Vladimir Nikolayevich Peregudov was named in the obituary notice that "Krasnaya Zvezda" published on 19 September 1967. Sorrowful lines: "Chief designer retired Engr-Capt 1st Rank Vladimir Nikolayevich Peregudov, Hero of Socialist Labor, died at the age of 66 after a lengthy illness." But even then there was no mention of the fact that Peregudov was among the founders of our nuclear submarine fleet and the chief designer of the first Soviet nuclear submarine.

The "Leninskiy Komsomol" was the beginning of an evolution that led to the appearance of underwater giants that are now on duty in the depths of the oceans. What Peregudov and the design team did can be called a scientific and technical feat without any exaggeration. This team as well as dozens of other scientific, production and research organizations had to resolve a huge task.

"Of course," one of the participants in that work long ago (he cannot be named openly even now) told me, "if we had built an ordinary diesel submarine, then, with some degree or other of innovation and deviations, it would have been an easy matter. But here everything was new and unusually exacting. After all, it was atomic and moreover hidden under the water. Thousands upon thousands of questions arose and that is no joke. It was indeed a huge task. That is how it was."

Why was the problem so complex? The "blue dream" of the submariners and designers of all countries with ships was the so-called "single engine," that is, an engine suitable for underwater as well as surface navigation. From the very appearance of the first military ships, there was no end to efforts to build such an engine. The nuclear power plant moved the question from theory to the practical sphere.

Peregudov often spoke about this in friendly conversations with Prof Boris Mikhaylovich Malinin, doctor of technical sciences, USSR State Prize winner, founder of Soviet submarine building, and chief designer of the first Soviet diesel submarines (of types "D," "M" and "Shch"). Peregudov was 13 years younger than Malinin. Malinin ("Krasnaya Zvezda" told about him in the essay "Designer of the Legendary 'Shchuka'" on 18 September 1979) was an engineer of the "old formation," a graduate of a polytechnic institute who came to the underwater navigation department of the Baltic Plant back in 1914, and Peregudov received his education after the October Revolution. They were different people but submarines were their fate and this unites them, men who were otherwise so dissimilar.

In 1947, Malinin shows Peregudov the manuscript of a large article.

"Very well said," Peregudov tears himself away from the text and looks at Malinin. "Radar has become the broom that sweeps ships from the surface". Wonderful, Boris Mikhaylovich! But how does one see to that the boat can stay down as long as possible? Even the best foreign submarine in World War II—the German submarine of the 21st series—could stay down only 285 miles at a speed of 6 knots."

"And that is much more than the United States and England achieved," attests Malinin. "Read on."

And further B. Malinin went on to declare with confidence that a boat becomes a submarine in the full sense of the word only when they resolve the "problem of a high-power engine of low weight and small dimensions to ensure high speeds of navigation for the boat under water." He considered that engines powered by intranuclear (atomic) energy meet these requirements.

Conversing amicably, Malinin did not know that he had a little more than 2 years to live—his heart would fail and Peregudov could not foresee that in 1952 he would lead the development of the Soviet nuclear submarine. At the time of their conversation, Peregudov managed the preliminary design of our first postwar diesel submarine, striving to have its tactical and technical results greatly exceed everything that Soviet shipbuilding had achieved to date. But he was not to complete it. In the preliminary design stage, they considered it necessary to transfer him to a research institute. Another person would bring this boat to completion (it still sails today).

And soon they would hint to Peregudov that another project was waiting for him and the designer did not need much insight to understand that this project was for a nuclear submarine.

As a designer, he already understood its tremendous advantages rather clearly. The nuclear boat will become a true submarine and not a diving ship. A nuclear reactor does not need air to work and it provides great capacities unattainable by diesel engines and an abundance of power. Its range will be limited not by the supply of fuel but of food and by the physical possibilities of people to remain in the enclosed space of the rigid hull. Greater power means unheard-of speeds under water. And since it will not be necessary for the boat to come to the surface on long cruises, it will be extremely difficult to detect it in the ocean.... As a designer, he also understood all of the extraordinary difficulties in building a qualitatively new ship. A more rigid hull will be required for greater operating depths. Space will have to be found in this hull for a nuclear reactor while providing for the dependable protection of people. For the first time, steam will be driven under water, that is, a steam turbine with all its numerous and voluminous attributes. The turbine will sharply increase the noisiness of the submarine and this cannot be allowed....

By this time, Peregudov was already seriously ill. As a communist, scientist and officer, however, he could not refuse the offer. Thus, Engr-Capt 1st Rank V. Peregudov was named chief designer of the first nuclear submarine.

Lines from His Biography

The wheels of the heated freight car with the inscription: "Forty people—eight horses" (people of the older generation still remember these two-axled brick-red boxes with bumpers and a screw coupling) clattered on the joints of the rails. The Komsomol sent 13 young men from the Volga town of Balakovo to Petrograd to study.

"We walked to Peter in our bast shoes," Peregudov will later say to his children, remembering the past. But bast shoes did not surprise anyone in the fourth year of the October Revolution.

In June 1921, Komsomol member Peregudov volunteered for the Red Navy.

Initially he is assigned to accelerated courses for technicians of the fleet command staff but they disband the courses in September 1921 and Peregudov enters the school of the fleet command staff. On 15 October 1922, he is transferred to the Navy Engineering School (the future renowned "Dzerzhinka") as a student (the word "kursant" [cadet] appeared in 1926). At that time, it was still not a higher institution and did not have the name of imeni Feliks Edmundovich

The pages of the orders of the school director (they are preserved in the Central State Archives of the navy) breathe the atmosphere of the unbelievably difficult years of the young Soviet state. It was still not even able to provide the future naval engineers with enough pencils. I found the following order: "Students receive four notebooks, three pages of typographic paper and one ordinary pencil each per month. One drawing pencil is issued for every three students." Not so much....

But the Komsomol members and sailors of the 1920's were persistent and stubborn. Their biographies begin almost together with the history of the young Red Navy. On 10 July 1924, the cruiser "Avrora" and the training ship "Komsomolets" are sent from Kronstadt on the first cruise abroad after the October Revolution. Their course: Kronstadt—Bergen (Norway)—Murmansk—Arkhangelsk—Trondheim (Norway)—Kronstadt. Peregudov stands in formation with his friend from Balakovo Sergei Turkov, with whom he came to Petrograd 3 years before.

The commander of the "Avrora" L.A. Polenov pays a visit to the town mayor of Bergen. Learning how many sailors will go on shore, the major is horrified: "What will become of little Bergen!" and begins to tell Polenov about the outrages usually perpetrated by American and English sailors. But a day or two later the newspapers will write that the Soviet sailors were "nice charming boys." The ice of mistrust thawed quickly and thousands of citizens come to the short to see the Soviet group off.

The cruise around Europe is a good political school for all those participating in it and, of course, for Peregudov. Later he is abroad several times: Italy, Spain, United States, Germany....

Soon after finishing the school, Peregudov becomes a student of the Naval Academy. The capabilities of the young engineer are noticed by A.N. Krylov, "admiral of ship science" teaching at the academy.

Peregudov, a pupil at "Dzerzhinka," a graduate of the Naval Academy and a born mathematician, rather quickly finds himself in that environment for which he seems to have been created—in design and research teams. His biography did indeed coincide with the history of the regeneration and establishment of the navy. He graduated from the school in 1926 and the following year the first Soviet submarines "Dekabrist," "Harodovolets" and "Krasnogvardeyets" were laid in Leningrad at Baltic Plant. When Peregudov finished the academy (after defending his diploma work "Squadron Submarine," he was awarded the title of naval engineer-shipbuilder), the "Dekabrist" went out for trials. Peregudov was made part of the acceptance commission. Then Peregudov tested the renowned "Shchuki."

Peregudov served almost 2 years in the submarine section of the scientific-technical committee of the NTK of the Naval Forces Administration of the Workers and

Peasants Red Army. The NTK is the scientific-technical committee of the navy, an important subdivision where much was decided, including what the navy was to be. Here duty brought him in contact with outstanding people who left a noticeable mark in the history of Soviet submarine forces, including with the future chief designer of type "K" submarines, Mikhail Alekseyevich Rudnitskiy.

From the personnel file of V. Peregudov: "A cheerful and open character. Impulsive. Very energetic worker. Punctual. Industrious. Although he does a good job of carrying out theoretical research, he is greatly attracted to practical matters.... He has a great deal of initiative. He is especially inclined toward design and research work.... He is one of the leading workers in submarine shipbuilding. He knows how to achieve set tasks. He demands much of his subordinates. He knows how to set a task for his subordinates and to show ways to resolve it.

Creators of the "Eski"

One of the Western falsifiers of history asserted that secret drawings of the German submarine designed in 1932 fell into the hands of the Russians. The utilization of these plans led to the building of the submarine of type "S."

This is how it really was. While on a mission abroad in 1932, several designers, including Peregudov, took part for a month in the Mediterranean Sea in the testing of the "Ye-1" submarine built by the Spanish using the drawings of the private firm "Deshimag." Our engineers liked the "Ye-1." And they signed a contract (a contract!) with "Deshimag" for the development of the engineering plan for a new submarine. But Soviet specialists formulated the program and requirements determining the future of military qualities of the ship. Under this program—a Soviet program, I emphasize once again—"Deshimag" developed the engineering plan—several dozen drawings. As is customary, our country settled accounts with "Deshimag." But the working documentation, that is, the blueprints used directly in the building of the submarines (and there are many many hundreds of them), were done by Soviet designers—a group led by S. Turkov, a childhood friend of Peregudov who volunteered for the navy along with him. The hull sector was headed by V. Peregudov and the electromechanical sector by V. Kritskiy, later an engineer-rear admiral (died in 1966).

Peregudov made many interesting design decisions. The boat was characterized by many innovations.

Initially it was called "Ye-2" but later was given the letter "S," which means "medium" (in displacement).

During the Great Patriotic War, the success rate of the "eski" was second to that of Malinin's "shchuki." The "eski" sank 16 and damaged 6 warships and destroyed

51 and damaged 7 enemy transports. The total displacement of the ships and vessels sent to the bottom by "eski" was more than 170,000 tons. More than 29,000 tons were damaged. Precisely the Baltic S-18 under the command of A.I. Marinesko sank the enemy liner "Wilhelm Gustlov" on the night of 30 January 1945.

But let us return to the 1930's. At the height of the work on the "eska," they arrest Turkov. The investigator summons Peregudov and demands that he unmask the "enemy of the people and traitor Turkov." He is unbending: "I have known Turkov since I was 11. I know him as well as I know myself. He is no enemy. I will not write anything!" Soon they come for Peregudov himself. There is a search. What are they looking for in the house of the peasant son and engineer of the Red Navy Peregudov? His wife Nina Anatolyevna went numb. Their eldest son wakes up. The youngest, just 3 years old, sleeps peacefully. The neighbors hid in their rooms.^e

The action took place in the winter. They led Peregudov away in a leather overcoat with fur lining. The cell is cold and dark. Here the designer becomes acquainted with a combined-arms commander. There is no telling what kind of rank he has: badges of rank have been torn from his uniform. Seized during the warm time of the year, the commander freezes desperately in a light summer coat. Peregudov silently spreads his leather jacket for both of them. So it was under these circumstances that the future Marshal of the Soviet Union and one of the outstanding military leaders of the Great Patriotic War Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskiy and the future founder of the Soviet nuclear submarine fleet and Hero of Socialist Labor Vladimir Nikolayevich Peregudov became brothers. They were to meet later only in defeated Germany, accidentally. They would embrace so that their bones almost crack.

Peregudov did not give the information that they demanded of him and did not harm either himself or others. Maybe that was the reason and maybe it was because the "eska" was very badly needed, but they released Peregudov within a few months. "A dead man arrived," remembers Nina Anatolyevna, "I even took him out for a walk during the evenings, when there were fewer people on the street." At home it all came out, like a moan: "How they beat me!"

The prison, the beatings and the torture thoroughly ruined his health. This is why, when they named Peregudov chief designer of the nuclear submarine, he was already seriously ill.

Comrades In Arms Remember

"This is how it all started," said to me N.A. Dollezhal, chief designer of the submarine reactor, now an academician, twice Hero of Socialist Labor, and winner of the Lenin and state prizes of the USSR. "Peregudov and Genrikh Aliyevich Gasanov, an eminent specialist in ship power engineering, came to me and the three of us

locked ourselves in my office, not answering any telephone calls. Not for a day or two but for a month. We set up the drawing board and from morning to night we calculated and drew and again calculated and drew. We gradually determined the approximate weight and dimensions of the nuclear power plant. Without knowing this, Peregudov could not begin to design the ship. It was necessary to resolve still another matter of considerable importance: how will the reactor act not under stable land conditions but on the rolling and pitching submarine, in complex movement in circulations, and when the hull is compressed in the depths.... They turned to the scientific subject leader academician Anatoliy Petrovich Aleksandrov. After research and calculations, Aleksandrov determined that the submarine's movement is not reflected in the normal work of the reactor.

Scientists, with the exception of A.P. Aleksandrov, had no concept of submarines. Peregudov organized their visit to "diesel submarines." The physicists were amazed.

"I was horrified by the closeness," recalls the chief designer of the reactor.

"Then someone joked that they needed to squeeze Dollezhal between the diesel engines. I said to Peregudov: 'I do not understand how people can exist here.' He grinned: 'Submariners are an especially hardy breed of people. But we will improve living conditions on our boat.' And we have to put a reactor in these close quarters. What a job! But, as you can see, we managed."

Peregudov, of course, did not work alone. I already mentioned G.A. Gasanov, later winner of the Lenin Prize, Hero of Socialist Labor, doctor of technical sciences, and professor who managed the large design team to the very end. There are several other names that must also be mentioned. They are Lenin Prize winners G.A. Voronich, V.P. Goryachev and P.D. Degtyarev. In the work on the submarine project, Peregudov was helped by the outstanding specialists of the branch V.P. Funikov, V.Ya. Stupanov, Yu.K. Bayev, A.N. Gubanov and others. Entire collectives were involved, for example major research centers headed by Lenin Prize winners V.I. Pershin (also a "Dzerzhinka" pupil) and G.I. Kapyrin, dozens of brilliant specialists, talented designers and production organizers.

In the mid-1950's, when the surviving victims of Stalinist terror began to return, Peregudov included in his team such an experienced designer as M.G. Rusanov, who still simply could not believe that he was free and again able to pursue his favorite work (he had spent the last year beyond the "101st" kilometer in...a button crew). Rusanov was not the only former "zek" [prisoner] whom Peregudov hired (at that time, this required quite a lot of courage).

All those who knew Peregudov note that he did not consider himself infallible and made decisions only after the most careful council with specialists.

"He loved young people and had bold confidence in them," a now-prominent designer told me. "I remember one occasion. In the testing of the nuclear submarine, my schoolmate, then an ordinary designer, gave commands to the boatswain in the ascent and descent, because different habits were required than on a diesel submarine. The designer took charge, proceeding from theory and faultless knowledge of the system that he helped to create. 'Go on, go on,' the engineer encouraged the boatswain. Peregudov was right there at the central post and he saw and heard everything. He did not give any praise to the designer but soon, when the intermediate stages were past, he appointed him head of a major subunit. Is this not a degree of confidence?"

And here is still another testimony of a specialist:

"When we delivered the submarine, I was busy with important operations, including the heeling test. The plant management grumbled: 'Why did they send a boy?' Peregudov said three words: 'I trust him.' And there were no more questions."

The fondest memories of Peregudov belonged to academician A.P. Aleksandrov, three times Hero of Socialist Labor and winner of the Lenin and state prizes of the USSR. This is what he told me:

"V.A. Malyshev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, introduced us. I liked Peregudov immediately, from our first conversation. I understood that before me was a man of action and a specialist with profound knowledge. More than that, he delved deeply into the scientific nature of questions that had to be resolved. He seemed to be a designer and scientist all at once. It was easy to work with him, although there was a good deal of arguing. There were enough problems and there was no getting around discussions but Peregudov's profound competence and practical decency could be seen in them, as could an exceptional sense of responsibility."

The work demanded required that the team show unprecedented precision and discipline literally in everything. And Peregudov himself gave us an example.

"You look in on him," recalls a veteran, "and someone is with him. He will look at his watch and say: 'Just 10 more minutes.' Exactly 10 minutes later—go. You either meet the comrade at the door after he has already resolved all the questions or both of them are standing there saying good-by."

"You could sense a true naval officer in him," says another designer. "He himself thought extremely logically and taught us to do so as well. He could not stand any 'fuzzy' thinking. But he did not explode, he was

polite. To be sure, I sometimes observed what this politeness cost him, especially in reports "at the top." He was outwardly calm but his upper lip quivered. And the further the project proceeded, the more we sensed that our chief was working himself to death, with no thought for himself. At times it was painful to look at him but we understood the degree of his responsibility to the country."

The bow end of the ship was the cause of many discussions. In diesel submarines, the hull contours (especially the bow end) ensure the best seaworthiness in a surface position to the detriment of these qualities under water. But a nuclear submarine can stay under water for a very very long time. This means that it is necessary to optimize the bow end for underwater navigation.

The bow end of the "Leninskiy Komsomol" with its whalelike form was optimum precisely in the underwater position. To some extent, Peregudov thereby renounced surface seaworthiness. He said that it is necessary to build a ship whose qualities would approach those of a torpedo. And this is what he sought, demanding that the hull and operations room enclosure be "licked smooth" and that everything be removed that interferes with the complete streamlining of the submarine.

It was Peregudov who proposed the "bow" that we now see in photographs. In this connection, however, since the traditional forms had been violated, difficulties immediately arose in extremely important matters involving the intended use of the submarine. How, for example, should the torpedo tubes be arranged?

Difficulties and problems. It seemed that our heads were splitting from them but the chief designer remained simple, approachable and affable.

"A solar eclipse was expected," one designer recalls. "We all darkened our glass in advance. The time came and we approached Peregudov: 'Vladimir Nikolayevich, come with us.' He went with us without a lot of ceremony and observed this rare phenomenon along with all the others. He later told Aleksandrov about it with enthusiasm."

An event during the mooring tests provided the last point in the coming together of one of the most prominent physicists in the world and the chief designer of the first nuclear submarine, when both were thoroughly imbued with mutual respect. Aleksandrov himself told me about it:

"When they began to put into operation the nuclear plant, some hydraulic pounding was heard in the system. Nothing similar was happening in the experimental system. What was the matter? If the pounding continues, a pipe could break. There was a crowd and a nervous situation on the submarine. Peregudov was there but he was calm and did not ask me about anything. A very responsible comrade comes up and says: 'How can I

help, Anatoliy Petrovich?' I say: 'Remove everyone who does not need to be here!' And, in a rage, I said exactly where they should go. No problem, he did not take offense but just waved his hand, saying, in effect, let those leave who have nothing to do. Things quieted down and after 15 or 20 minutes we figured out what was happening. We got the system revved up and with joy everyone watched the turning of the propellers of our first nuclear submarine moored at the pier. Peregudov did not approach me and I greatly appreciated his restraint. He understood that his interference would not contribute anything at that time—the physicists were more competent than he and would more readily understand what needed to be done.

Birth of a Ship

Peregudov's illness progressed. He went to sea for the trials of his creation thoroughly weakened.

The senior assistant of the first nuclear submarine (now Ret. Rear Admiral L.M. Zhiltsov, Hero of the Soviet Union) recalls:

"When in the tests the reactor drove the submarine to standard speed, everyone on the bridge was shaken...by the quietness. For the first time in all my duty on submarines, I heard the sound of the waves near the bow end. On conventional submarines, the sound of the exhaust from the diesel engines covers everything else. But here there was no rattling and no vibration."

"The chief designer is asked to go topsides," they relayed to the central post, where Peregudov was. Vladimir Nikolayevich went up on the bridge. Commander in Chief of the Navy Admiral S. Gorshkov said to him: "Look what a marvel you created, just look!" The picture was indeed tremendous. The water through which the whalelike bow was slicing was seething. Peregudov kept silent, as though shaken. Everyone could see that the chief designer was holding on with the last of his strength and would probably never be able to go to sea again.

After a few minutes, Peregudov excused himself from the commander in chief: "Today my job is to go through the compartments and listen to the men." And he again disappeared through the upper deck hatch....

The tests were successful. At some stage in them, the first deep-water dive took place. I soon took over the submarine from Capt 1st Rank L.G. Osipenko, the first nuclear submarine commander. And then our ship crossed the North Pole under the ice and surfaced in that area.

This took place when the creator of the nuclear submarine was already quite ill. He gave all of his strength to the nuclear project. Fate was counting down the last hours of his life....

The Central Naval Museum preserves Peregudov's "Hammer and Sickle" gold medal, two Orders of Lenin, two Red Banner orders, two Patriotic War Second Class orders, and Red Star order. The family of the chief designer has the certificate indicating that the awards were given over to the Central Naval Museum. And it is a large family: his wife Nina Anatolyevna, sons and daughter. They are all Peregudovs, even though Vladimir Nikolayevich and Nina Anatolyevna adopted two sons soon after the end of the war. Having adopted two boys, the Peregudovs did not differentiate at all between them and their own children. And they grew up as Peregudovs, proud of their family name and holding its honor high.

Almost up to his final years, the chief designer of the first Soviet nuclear submarine, his wife and children lived in a communal apartment for eight families! Peregudov was repeatedly offered a separate apartment but he always relinquished it to one of his colleagues whose situation he considered to be worse.

Peregudov has remained in our memory as a Personality with a capital letter. Even now, in the epoch of perestroika, he would feel at home. The style and the standards of Peregudov the organizer fully correspond to the standards toward which we are now striving. He would not have to restructure himself, I was told by former colleagues of Peregudov, who asked: Why does the navy not yet have a ship bearing the name of the creator of the first nuclear submarine? (And the "Leninskiy Komsomol" has been on military duty in the navy up to this time.) Why does the widow of the outstanding designer, to whom the Motherland owes so much, not have her own room? Why are the authorities in the city where Nina Anatolyevna lives who know about this keeping silent? It is our common duty not only to the present but also to the future to make commensurate what the man did for the country and what was given back to him.

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More on Career of Kuznetsov
18010100 Moscow AGITATOR in Russian
No 17 (signed to press 11 Aug 88) pp 26-29

[Article by Maj Gen A. Skrylnik under rubric "Political Biographies": "People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov"]

[Text] The "Voyennyy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar" [Military Encyclopedic Dictionary] devotes a brief reference to Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov, from which one can learn the years he lived (1902-1974), that the rank of vice admiral was conferred on him in 1956, and certain other information from his service record. Neither the name nor rank will say anything at all to a young person because our "grateful memory" did not last long. We did too much to see that the figure of a remarkable naval commander and a very prominent naval leader of the

Great Patriotic War period was forgotten and effaced, and all because this person was too out of the ordinary, too independent and original. He blended in poorly with the era of the cult of personality and equally did not suit the era of voluntarism inasmuch as he remained under all conditions an honest party person who was unable to sacrifice principle.

For the entire war Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov headed the People's Commissariat of the Navy and performed responsible duties as a member of the Headquarters, Supreme High Command. I had occasion to observe Kuznetsov familiarizing I. V. Stalin with Sevastopol during the days the Yalta Conference of the heads of anti-Hitler coalition powers was at work. From our radio room it was clearly apparent that the People's Commissar led the Supreme Commander into Black Sea Fleet Headquarters freely and without the appearance of any fawning.

Not only the officers, but also the first-year Red Navy men knew that Nikolay Gerasimovich was born and grew up in a poor peasant family, that at age 17 he became a navymen of the Severnaya Dvina Flotilla, and he became People's Commissar of the Navy when not yet 37. Despite his youth he had every reason to occupy the high post. By that time Kuznetsov had naval school, the Naval Academy, and command of ship subunits, a cruiser and finally the Pacific Fleet behind him. Kuznetsov had been in Spain for more than a year as naval attache to the Soviet Embassy, while at the same time performing duties as chief naval adviser. He had occasion to take part in working out and accomplishing many combat operations of the Republican Navy.

A very important concern of Don Nikolas, as the Spanish sailors called Kuznetsov, was to ensure lines of communication between Spain and the USSR, to organize convoys, to meet them and to quickly unload combat equipment, weapons and ammunition. That year gave Nikolay Gerasimovich a great deal in his development as a major military leader. Later in developing decisions he often would check his views on the development and preparation of the Navy with everything instructive that combat operations in Spain had demonstrated.

In taking over the position of People's Commissar Kuznetsov received a heritage that was not an easy one. Direction of the Navy at all echelons had been weakened by Stalin's repressions. Many experienced fleet commanders, including those tempered by the flame of Civil War, were victims of the repressions. It reached a point where the People's Commissariat of the Navy was headed up by torturer M. Frinovskiy, who had nothing to do with the Navy. He worked as deputy to People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Yezhov and took a direct part in the tortures and annihilation of many party, state and military figures including Postyshev, Tukhachevskiy and Yakir.

An educated and professionally mature navyman capable of thinking independently and boldly displaying initiative came to leadership of the Navy in the person of Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov. Black Sea Fleet Commander I. Kozhanov divined the naval leadership talent in him long before that. In one of his articles back in 1935 he wrote about the commander of the cruiser "Chervona Ukraina": "Unquestionably he is the youngest among captains of all world navies, but the growth of this young commander is continuous. I have had more than one occasion to criticize Kuznetsov's mistakes (and probably will do so more than once yet), but in criticizing him I admire him at the same, since his mistakes are not out of idleness, self-complacency or laziness. They are mistakes of growth, of youthful energy and of bold initiative."

Vice Admiral S. D. Soloukhin, who had occasion to work directly with Kuznetsov at various times, reveals his personal merits in his own way: "He took over major positions, he was stern, and it happened that he made mistakes. . . . But I still remember from the cruiser that he says what he thinks without regard for who holds what post."

The new People's Commissar began performing his duties with his inherent energy. Questions involving fulfillment of the long-range program for naval organizational development which had been adopted by the government several years before took up much time. Large-scale work unfolded. Battleships and heavy cruisers were laid down at shipyards. Kuznetsov was not entirely in agreement with that direction of the Navy's development. "No importance was attached to aircraft carriers in the program," he would note subsequently. For the time being, however, Nikolay Gerasimovich persistently strove to accomplish at least partial measures aimed at ensuring that combatant ships conformed more to requirements of the impending war. What it cost him to "force through" the question of reinforcing air defense of new cruisers and of additionally installing antiaircraft guns on them! Ships also were being built with great difficulties.

The People's Commissar of the Navy was not defending something narrowly departmental or personal but the interests of national security in ensuring that the new ships conformed to requirements of the impending war. Nevertheless, his persistence and consistency was not to everyone's liking. Moreover, Nikolay Gerasimovich's pointed statements often caused dissatisfaction or even irritation among the highest leadership. During one conference in the Kremlin Stalin tossed a menacing rejoinder at him: "Kuznetsov, why are you always abusing me? You know the organs have been asking permission to take up your case for a long time now."

Fortunately, that time everything ended only with such a warning. Nikolay Gerasimovich did not suffer from the repressions, but he saw at every step the perniciousness of the general atmosphere of absolute rule which had

been established in the country and which forced many to adapt themselves to Stalin's opinion. The right to truth in the final instance was given to one "wise and infallible" person and others were assigned the lot of performers. Meanwhile the situation demanded that every military leader have a profound comprehension of the menacing events developing in the world arena, and initiative and boldness within the bounds of his responsibility for national security. War already was blazing in the West. The true aspirations of German fascism were being revealed more and more clearly.

Today the reasons are well known for the war's unfortunate beginning for us, including the most important ones—the grossest errors and miscalculations of Stalin and his entourage in estimating the situation and the delay in placing the Army in combat readiness. By the way, Kuznetsov was one of the first to say this openly. He wrote in the mid-1960's: "I do not make bold to offer an exhaustive answer to the question of just what are the reasons for the unfortunate beginning of the war, but I am sure that one reason was the fact that none of the state leaders said loudly and firmly: 'The homeland is in danger!'"

Within the limits of what was assigned him the People's Commissar of the Navy did everything to see that the aggressor's attack was no surprise for the Navy. The fascist aircraft which appeared in the skies over Sevastopol, Liyepaya, Odessa, Izmail and other naval bases on the night of 22 June met an organized rebuff. The enemy lost several Junkers. Danube Flotilla gunners immediately answered the first volleys from the enemy shore with fire. The energy and proficiency of hundreds on thousands of navymen and the mobilizing force of a timely combat order disrupted the enemy's attempt to deliver a surprise attack. That day not one of our ships and not one aircraft of Naval Aviation was lost; not one landing force was allowed on Soviet soil.

The psychology of any military leader, a person who essentially prepares for war all his life, is such that the first combat order is the most difficult for him. It is commonly known that many of our military leaders proved themselves in different ways on the first day of Hitler's aggression. The People's Commissar of the Navy withstood the test for military and state maturity, in so doing displaying enviable perspicacity, strength of will and, finally, civic courage. He displayed this because long before the guns opened up essentially all his actions, thoughts and concerns were determined by one thing: an improvement in naval personnel's combat training and development and mastery of a strict system of readiness conditions ensuring the capability of joining battle in a matter of minutes.

At a commanders' conference soon after taking over his new position Nikolay Gerasimovich shared his thoughts about the need for developing a system of operational readiness conditions:

"In Spain I felt that a system was needed that would permit readying ships for battle in the shortest possible time," he said.

Several months later the Main Naval Staff Directive on Operational Readiness Conditions of Fleets and Forces [Soyedineniye] was issued and active mastery of the complex system unfolded in the fleets. Alerts were announced by radio, by plant whistles, and by the firing of warning guns and weapons and equipment were placed in readiness for battle night and day at bases, aboard ships, and in shore units. There was a stubborn struggle for time at all command and control levels not only for hours, but also for minutes from the moment the signal was given until the readiness report came. The many-sided activity of staffs and establishments was aimed at converting the entire naval mechanism to a wartime footing.

The People's Commissar saw the threat of attack growing. Intelligence summaries contained information about guns being unloaded and batteries being deployed in the ports of contiguous states and about fascist ships and spy aircraft appearing in our operations zone. In response to queries from commanders on how to handle violators and although he was very familiar with instructions that categorically prohibited opening fire on provocateurs, Kuznetsov replied with the order: "Open fire against violators without warning." Kuznetsov was summoned to Stalin when German aircraft were fired on over Liyepaya on 18 March. Beriya was sitting in the office in addition to Stalin. Nikolay Gerasimovich immediately caught the drift. The People's Commissar of the Navy received a severe reprimand and was ordered to rescind the instruction immediately. In obeying, Kuznetsov issued a new directive through his staff: "Do not open fire but send your fighters to make the enemy land on the airfield."

Today it seems strange to us: it was apparent from everything that the storm of war would break out at any moment but the country's leadership was vacillating. Fearing to provoke the Germans to an armed clash, it was demanding no steps be taken to place the troops of border districts in combat readiness without "special direction."

Of course we did not want war and were attempting to delay it, but what if it already is becoming obvious? Apparently those thoughts also gave Kuznetsov no rest in those days. He scrupulously reported more and more new evidence of an imminent war and on receiving no instructions drew correct conclusions. In early May the fleets reinforced reconnaissance and patrol duty. On 19 June Kuznetsov ordered commanders of fleets and flotillas of western sectors to declare Operational Readiness No 2, under which ships took on all necessary stores and placed weapons and equipment in order, and alert duty was established in the forces [soyedineniye]. The demand also followed to disperse forces and black out main bases.

At the end of the day on 21 June People's Commissar of Defense S. K. Timoshenko announced the possibility of an attack and Kuznetsov issued fleets the order: "Operational Readiness No 1. Immediately. Kuznetsov."

To this day I remember those anxious minutes when my Red Fleet colleagues, A. Malygin and N. Chernyshev of the Fleet Communications Center, received this message in Sevastopol. Only a few minutes went by when the naval yard whistle began a bass howl over the city and warning-gun shots sounded—the signals for quarters.

The practiced system of going over to a full readiness condition functioned faultlessly. By 0230 hours the Black Sea Fleet and the other fleets had assumed the readiness condition. The commanders were asking the People's Commissar over the phone: "Is it permitted to open fire in case of an obvious attack on ships or bases?" "You can and must," came the answer from Moscow.

Nikolay Gerasimovich transmitted the dramatic nature of those minutes best of all in his memoirs: "It was already apparent at 0200 hours. I lay down on the sofa, trying to picture what was happening in the fleets. The rather hollow ring of the telephone brought me to my feet. The Black Sea Fleet commander was reporting. An air raid had been made on Sevastopol. Antiaircraft artillery was repelling the attack of aircraft.

"I looked at my watch: 0315 hours. That is when it began... There was no longer any doubt—it was war!"

"I called Stalin on different telephones and tried to gain a personal conversation with him. Nothing came of it. Again I called the duty officer:

"I request you to pass on to Comrade Stalin that German aircraft are bombing Sevastopol. It is war!"

"I will report to whom I am supposed to report," answered the duty officer.

"A minute later I heard a ring. A dissatisfied, somehow irritated voice sounded over the phone: 'Do you understand what you are reporting?' This was G. M. Malenkov.

"I understand and report with all responsibility: the war already has begun!"

"Malenkov hung up. He apparently did not believe me. Then on my own responsibility I ordered the official announcement of the beginning of war and about repelling enemy attacks by all means be passed on to the fleets."

Leafing through the pages of Kuznetsov's biography, a person involuntarily catches himself thinking that people of initiative who boldly defend their views without

foregoing their conscience are deeply alien to the atmosphere of the cult of personality, just as they are to voluntarism and stagnant processes.

The situation in the world remained tense after the victory over fascism. International imperialism unfolded a genuine "cold war" and simultaneously an arms race against our country. The Soviet state was attempting to strengthen defense in every possible way, and much emphasis was placed on the Navy's further development. With consideration of wartime experience Kuznetsov introduced suggestions to plans for building ships and perfecting naval weapons. Unfortunately the atmosphere of the cult of personality continued to hinder implementation of the plans. Now and then there would be a change in the "curators" over the Navy from Stalin's entourage who instead of resolving complex issues would try to brush them aside. In striving to fulfill government decisions Kuznetsov firmly defended his views regardless of the persons involved. A campaign of persecution unfolded against the "unaccommodating" Minister of the Navy in 1946. An incompetent commission recognized the work of the Main Navy Staff as weak. Right after this a case was fabricated involving a transfer of torpedo blueprints to the allies which occurred in the war years. A court of honor, which even then was called a "vile comedy" by many, was convened for a group of admirals and Kuznetsov. Nikolay Gerasimovich was reduced in rank to rear admiral and appointed commander of the Pacific Fleet.

Two years later he again was Minister of the Navy and then Deputy Minister of Defense and CIC of the Navy. In 1955 the highest military rank for the Navy was introduced in the country—Fleet Admiral Soviet Union. Navymen perceived the conferral of this rank on Kuznetsov as recognition of his services to the state.

The first nuclear-powered submarine was laid down and missile tests conducted under Kuznetsov's leadership. Although the situation improved somewhat after Stalin's death, Kuznetsov continued to experience the incompetence of those who were trying to dictate their views to the Navy. Defending the need for the Navy's harmonious development at one conference, he openly told N. S. Khrushchev that he was incompetent in naval affairs. The pointed discussion did not pass without leaving a trace. Nikolay Gerasimovich became seriously ill.

Two months later he requested the Minister of Defense to relieve him of his position because of illness. There was no response to the request. Then a tragic incident occurred in the Navy. The battleship "Novorossiysk" blew up on a mine and sank, and there were victims. Although Kuznetsov actually had not been performing his duties for a half-year, he had to answer for what happened. In his letter to the CPSU Central Committee Presidium of 15 February 1956 he wrote: "I was summoned by the former Minister of Defense (G. K. Zhukov—Ed) and for 5-7 minutes in an exceptionally rude manner was informed of the decision to reduce me in

military rank and release me from the Armed Forces without right of restoration." At that same time Kuznetsov was given a party punishment, about which he learned 12 years later.

It now is difficult to believe that it was possible to treat in that way an honored person who had served the homeland honestly. Everyone who knew Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov remembers him as an exceptionally competent military leader and a genuine party member. From his youthful years he learned the moral rule taught him by a senior commander: "On meeting subordinates look people straight in the eye." As if it were now, I too see the far-off year of 1953 and the deck of the cruiser "Sverdlov," which was preparing for an overseas cruise to take part in a naval parade in honor of the coronation of the British Queen. The admiral strode along the ranks of navymen, attentively looking seamen, petty officers and officers in the face as if wishing to be reassured that each one would fulfill his duty. Then First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR and CIC of the Navy N. G. Kuznetsov wished the navymen success, concluding a short speech with the words: "Bear the Motherland's naval ensign on high and safeguard its honor!"

He left a good memory behind. His services were recognized on their merits by many of the Motherland's awards. And letters from war veterans, navymen and workers kept coming to the highest echelons and to the editorial offices of newspapers and journals with the request to restore justice with respect to Kuznetsov. The books and articles he had written have been popularized little until recently. His name was rarely found in the list of military leaders renowned in the war. This also would appear to have been affected by the circumstance that Nikolay Gerasimovich also built his relations with L. I. Brezhnev, who was chief of the Navy Political Directorate for a short time, only on the basis of principle. This was enough to ensure that any request with respect to Kuznetsov remained unanswered for long years. Unfortunately the Navy leadership also plunged Kuznetsov's name into oblivion as if there had never been such a person. This is why the Ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium restoring Nikolay Gerasimovich to the military rank of Fleet Admiral Soviet Union, which was conferred on him at one time for outstanding services in leadership of the Navy, was received as a genuine triumph of justice among the people and among Army and Navy personnel. By the way, it was proven once again that the genuine services of a prominent person do not fade over time and do not lose value in the eyes of countrymen. This is why it seems only the first step has been taken. The second is to reinforce the memory of Kuznetsov.

There are many methods of perpetuating a military leader's name. For navymen it is especially dear to see the name of a renowned admiral and officer on the side of a combatant ship. Today many of our ships named in honor of fleet commanders of the past war, members of military councils and heroes sail the seas and oceans, but

to this day there is no ship bearing the name of HSU Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov. But how proudly young people would step onto the deck of a guided missile cruiser or air-capable ship, let us say, called "Narkom Kuznetsov," experiencing high responsibility for the homeland's security and striving in everything to be worthy of the honored naval leader, genuine party member, and very decent man.

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Chernavin Navy Day Interview
*18010138 Moscow RABOCHAYA GAZETA in Russian
31 Jul 88 p 4*

[Interview with Flt Adm V. N. Chernavin: "Today Is Navy Day. Entrusted by the Motherland. Flt Adm V. N. Chernavin, commander in chief of the Navy, answers TASS correspondent's questions"]

[Text] [Question] Vladimir Nikolayevich, we met exactly one year ago on the celebration of USSR Navy Day and then, in answer to the question of what concerned you most as the commander in chief, you replied: "Perestroyka is moving much more slowly at all echelons of our mighty navy organism than would be desirable. The complicated problems that we have to solve have made it difficult for some people. But now we need bold and decisive action everywhere..."

[Answer] If I am to speak frankly, even today I feel dissatisfied with the pace of perestroyka in the navy. In my opinion, some people have become used to the revolutionary character of the words glasnost, perestroyka and uskoreniye [acceleration]. Nevertheless, neither the character of the international situation, nor our internal navy problems give us the right to euphoria, sluggishness and complacency. It is not by accident that the resolution of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference emphasizes that perestroyka requires further intensification and reliable guarantees for its irreversibility, because it is the only possible way of strengthening socialism and resolving pressing problems in social development in the interests of the people.

The conference documents contain specific instructions concerning the army and the navy. "All defense construction," the resolution states, "must henceforth be oriented principally on qualitative parameters, both with respect to equipment and military science and to the composition of the Armed Forces."

For us, navymen, this means achieving a substantial and radical improvement in all spheres of life and combat training. All of us, from the seaman to the commander in chief, must increase our work, discipline, skills and organizational ability. And not in words, but in actual specific matters, at that duty station which was entrusted

to you by the people and by the Motherland. We have heard enough loud words and rousing speeches. The time has now arrived for specific actions. Each military collective must create the kind of situation in which incompetent and slothful people feel uninvited and uncomfortable. Only in this way can one realistically count on a qualitative change for the better with respect to equipment and military science and in the service of navy personnel.

[Question] Please dwell in more detail on these points. Tell us what constitutes the might of the Navy and what its level of technical equipment is like?

[Answer] The Soviet ocean-going, atomic, nuclear missile navy has always developed in accordance with the newest achievements in scientific and technical progress. One of the characteristics of its modern features is the widespread application of nuclear power, which ensured a qualitative change in VMF [Navy] forces.

The foundation of its strategic might are the strategic forces which are on a permanent state of readiness for the immediate delivery of a retaliatory strike.

Complex tasks are confidently executed on the ocean expanses by our mighty missile cruisers, such as, the "Kirov," "Frunze," "Slava," and "Marshal Ustinov"; by the antisubmarine ships "Marshal Vasilevskiy," "Marshal Shaposhnikov," "Admiral Tributs," "Admiral Spiridonov," and "Admiral Zakharov," and by the landing ships "Aleksandr Nikolayev" and "Ivan Rogov" and many others.

Owing to the high level of technical equipping, the capabilities of the naval infantry and coastal rocket artillery units have increased immeasurably in comparison with, let us say, the period of the Great Patriotic War.

[Question] What could you say about today's relationship between the navy and science?

[Answer] The navy traditionally has been guided by science. And today scientific and technical progress, figuratively speaking, passes through every battle station of any ship executing an operational task. It cannot be any other way. However, I would not say that at the current stage the rate of development of NTP [scientific and technical progress] is fully in line with the needs of the times. An organic balance is not always observed in the relationships between the navy and science. And it is only under these conditions that we can keep in step with the times, take the lead in development, and not find ourselves in a position of catching up.

The integration of all elements of our science is not always implemented in a sufficiently full measure: basic research and operational and tactical elaboration [operativno-takticheskaya razrabotka], etc. As a result of this

kind of lack of linkup, it sometimes happens that some of our ships have equipment possessing the very highest combat potential, but it is far from being employed in the best way in practice.

In a word, we have complaints against naval scientists, designers and the professor and instructor staff of the naval academies and against employees of the scientific research institutes. Although on the other hand, I cannot but note their selfless work in creating the material and technical base of the navy.

Construction of the modern navy, new ships and aircraft, power plants, and weapons, and communications and control systems has always demanded colossal expenditures of forces and energy, persistent searches and the inspiration of many creative collectives, ship-builders and workers of the defense industry. Therefore, navymen treat their selfless work with respect and gratitude. To talk about this today is not superfluous, because, despite all of the difficulties that our society endured in the distant and recent past, we created a remarkable navy all the same.

[Question] What kinds of tasks confront our navy now?

[Answer] Personnel of ships and units of the Navy will strive in the summer period of training to utilize each minute of training time and each mile of sailing to the maximum and with great efficiency. Questions of organization and education and the motivation of each seaman at his station are being moved to the forefront. We must hold a firm course on the review of that which has not justified itself in the past and which impedes forward movement.

The question of increasing organizational ability and discipline everywhere is especially critical now. Navy-men know very well that success can come only to those of them who persistently conduct the fight for strict procedures in keeping with regulations [ustavnoy poryadok] and efficient organization of service, and who do not tolerate any kind of negative phenomena.

The tasks that navymen accomplish are defined tersely and clearly: to guarantee the security of the Motherland and our Warsaw Pact allies in sea and ocean directions. Our entire life is subordinated to this.

13052

Origins of Soviet Naval Aviation

18010140 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Oct 88 p 4

[Article by Capt 2d Rank A. Grigoryev under rubric
"Pages of History": "Naval Aviation"]

[Text] Naval officers with their families, servicemen in the regular forces and townspeople gathered on 16 Oct 1910 on Kulikovo field, which at that time was located outside Sevastopol's city limits. Vice Adm V. Sarnavskiy, the commanding officer of the Black Sea Fleet, was also there. His presence was to be expected: the flight of the navy's first airplane was imminent. All of those present watched with interest as two persons—Lt S. Dorozhinskiy and Noncommissioned Officer Ladonya—busied themselves around the aircraft...

The history leading up to this is as follows. In 1909, enthusiasts, a majority of whom were navymen, organized a private flying club in Sevastopol. Captain 2d Rank Kaskov, its chairman, submitted a request to Capt 2d Rank B. Kedrin, the chief of the Signals Service of the Black Sea Fleet, for assistance in acquiring an airplane from abroad. At that time, Kedrin, with Lieutenant Dorozhinskiy and Noncommissioned Officer Ladonya, were getting ready for a temporary duty assignment to France regarding radio communications matters. Kedrin entrusted Dorozhinskiy with the fulfillment of this task.

The firm "Antoinette" agreed to manufacture an airplane for the Russian navy for 1,200 rubles. In addition, as part of the price, it undertook to train one of the men in the art of operating this vehicle in the air. Dorozhinskiy and Noncommissioned Officer Ladonya remained at the firm. The first began to train as a pilot, and the second, as an aviation mechanic.

After he became a pilot, Lieutenant Dorozhinskiy sent a telegram to the commander of the navy regarding the acquisition of an airplane and asked payment for the purchase. Dorozhinskiy's calculation was simple. If the commander of the navy refused to make the payment, then the aircraft would become the property of the flying club, which would give the money for it. If the command would be able to find the money, then it would remain in Sevastopol's so-called naval aeronautics park, which had old air balloons in its inventory.

Vice Admiral Sarnavskiy made an affirmative decision.

In the latter part of July 1910, the aircraft was delivered to Sevastopol. On Kulikovo field, Dorozhinskiy, together with Ladonya, undertook its assembly and final preparations. And then the aforementioned 16th of September arrived—the day of history's first Russian flight in an airplane. After completing two circles over the airfield, the lieutenant gained altitude.

Taking the airplane off from Kulikovo field, Dorozhinskiy thought more than once that it would be a good idea to adapt this aircraft for flights from a water surface. Lieutenant Komarov, the supervisor of the aeronautics park, stated in his annual report for 1911 that in the month of June tests were held for flight from water with the airplane "Antoinette" No 1. Floats were attached to it, but it turned out in the tests that the airplane's forward float pitched heavily into the water, and therefore it could not gain enough speed for takeoff. Then a pontoon-equipped seaplane of the "Vuazen-Kanar" type was ordered in France. Dorozhinskiy also learned how to fly it. He became Russia's first seaplane aviator.

Kulikovo field in Sevastopol has long since become a residential area. A wide avenue here bears the name of the famous Soviet naval pilot Maj Gen Avn N. Ostrakov. Surely a memorial plaque should be established here in honor of Stanislav Faddeyevich Dorozhinskiy, the first Russian seaplane aviator.

13052

Vernikov Reflects on Spanish-U.S. Defense Agreement
18010224 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Oct 88 p 4

[Article by V. Vernikov in the column: "International Commentary": "Were Concessions Made?"]

[Text] Madrid. IZVESTIYA special reporter. So, one more step, the last one, remains on the way to realizing the new Spanish-American defense agreement—the authentication of about 100 articles of this document with the signatures of high-ranking representatives from both sides.

Last week's New York meeting between Minister of Foreign Affairs F. Fernandez-Ordonez of Spain and Secretary of State G. Shultz of the USA was the next to the last but definitely the decisive step in the protracted talks. This exhausting bargaining stretched out over a period of nine months and, in the words of the Spanish minister, threatened to "jeopardize the good will of mutual understanding," but nevertheless was brought to a successful conclusion thanks to "mutual concessions."

That is an interesting admission. Washington and Madrid declared their positions unchangeable a number of times. And all of a sudden there are two unexpected results: conclusion of an agreement and "mutual concessions." However, before we try to understand exactly who it was that made the concessions, let us review the substance of the argument. It was undoubtedly one of principle, involving the interests of both countries. Spain insisted on introducing into the text of the agreement words prohibiting the "delivery, transporting, and stockpiling of nuclear weapons on Spanish territory," thus reaffirming the fulfillment of conditions contained in the referendum addressing its membership in NATO and continuing the country's previously announced nuclear-free status. The USA, however, was categorically opposed to including the word "delivery" in the written version of the future document, justifiably reasoning that Spanish authorities could take the word in its literal meaning to prohibit entry of American warships carrying nuclear weapons into local ports.

I remind the reader of the decision the Pentagon was forced to make relative to removal of the 72 F-16 aircraft from the Torrejon base, the difficult negotiations between Spain and NATO relative to the country's contribution to the block's activities, and Madrid's aspirations to join the Western European Union, once again on the condition that the country retain the nuclear-free status...All this was apparently too much for the Americans to make concessions to the socialist government. They not only were dead set against this, but on many occasions attempted to involve their NATO allies in bringing the stubborn Spaniards "to their senses," forcing them to be more compliant.

Just how successful were they? The statement made by the minister of foreign affairs cannot be interpreted in more than one way, although it does not say anything specifically. However, in a brief interview granted Spanish television by Prime Minister F. Gonzalez in connection with completion of the talks on the new agreement, not a word was said about concessions. On the contrary, the emphasis was on the fact that all of Spain's demands were met: the Spanish formulation was accepted relative to the delivery, stockpiling, and transporting of nuclear weapons; Spain reserves the right to resolve legal and labor problems associated with the remaining American military bases, etc. In addition, the head of the government stated that the most difficult aspect was not that particular "impasse," but Spain's demand that aircraft be removed from the Torrejon base, which was met.

"The new agreement paves the way for establishing more mature and steady relations between Spain and the USA, since it introduces new legal forms into the bilateral relationship which provide for stability in their collaboration in defense," states the press release prepared by a representative of the Spanish government. The statement made by the U.S. secretary of state is written in a somewhat different tone: "The agreement guarantees the continuation and effectiveness of considerable U.S. presence in Spain for defense of the West, including important naval operations linked with the Rota base, operations and air exercises at the Zaragoza base, and inflight refuelling associated with the Moron base."

Nevertheless, the classical question keeps coming to mind: "But was there a boy at all?" Were there any concessions or not? Of what kind, and who made them? The newspaper PAIS, after holding conversations with many officials who wished to remain anonymous, answered these questions as follows: "External pressure exerted on the government's nuclear policy have led to elucidation of certain nuances of interpretation. Spain has sent word to her allies in NATO, the Western European Union, and Washington, that the conditions of the 1986 referendum may undergo revision if so approved by the Cortes (the Spanish Parliament), both in time of crisis and in peacetime. Translated into the language of future talks, this hint serves the purpose of convincing Europeans and Americans that the government can make more concessions in the area of transportation and stockpiling of nuclear weapons." The authorities did not refute this statement.

There is no doubt that no official change in Spain's nuclear policy is forthcoming in the near future - the government simply cannot permit this. When after the signing, slated for October, the agreement will be submitted to the Cortes for ratification, this will give rise to not only heated debates, but apparently also to the little-liked revelations of specific concessions which are still hidden from public opinion. About the fact that they did take place there can be no doubt; this is what is causing alarm here.

Emerging Stereotypes of Returning Vets
18010232 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Sep 88 p 1

[Article by Warrant Officer Sergey Lyubkin, soldier-internationalist, Komsomol subunit committee secretary, under rubric "In This Spot Every Day": "Who Waits for Us at Home"]

[Text] I have already seen several times how the boys are released into the reserves after completing "compulsory service" [srochnaya] in Afghanistan. For some, this service was interrupted abruptly ahead of time. Those who are moving out will silently raise the third toast to them when they are at home.

The boys are leaving. There is even now a certain anxiety in the eyes of these veterans with wound chevrons and medals on their chests: "How will they meet us at home?" You see, they are returning as "afghantsy," and "soldier-internationalists." Yes, they will be taken around to schools and presidiums, and the importance of the arrangements will be raised by their presence alone. But the boys also know about a letter which came to one of them from a girl: "You know, 'afgantsy' are no longer in fashion..."

I am familiar with this feeling. Something is expected of you, and you are afraid to betray these expectations. You try, at times taking hold of yourself, to meet the expectations. You try to be like everyone else [pod grebyonku]. But everyone is not alike. And "internationalism" is understood and perceived differently. In the final analysis, many did not even think about it before Afghanistan. And they did not at all end up there like the volunteers for the international Spanish brigade or in a detachment of Che Guevara. It was decided for us that we were soldier-internationalists. And we—we performed our military duty, identifying it with international duty. It was only there that many realized what internationalism meant for themselves personally. But we will not try to be subtle: "many" is not everybody.

But no one can reproach us that we did our job poorly. The greatest punishment for those committing an offense was to be sent back to the Soviet Union ahead of time. It means that comrades do not trust you.

I repeat—we did our job honorably. But it comes up—all the same it comes up!—the contradiction between the stereotyped image of the "soldier-internationalist" and the real and tired people who have returned from Afghanistan.

The first stereotype is that of an "afghanets" who is always a person who has a keen sense of justice, who is aggressive, who fights against injustice, and who is uncompromising and irreproachable.

This, so to say, is the official "afghanets." An "afghanets" caricature. A poster. And we immediately get into a mess. For there are numerous stories about imposters who pin on foreign medals—this is the other side of the popularized stereotype. Outward attributes are necessary. A determined look, tough language and chopping the air with the palm of the hand. And simultaneously this stereotype makes it possible to overlook the ordinary boys. Those who are not able to sing soldiers' songs, speak to the public, and, in short, "to conform." The stereotype gives rise to formalism. Formalism is disbelief. That is why at times you feel natural only among your own, and you also shun someone else's and your own insincerity.

There is drunkenness and drug addiction among those who served "inconspicuously" in Afghanistan, frequently for this very reason. They suddenly saw that the country did not cordially greet "all of its sons," but only those who conform to the notion about heroes.

The official stereotype inevitably gives rise to a counterbalance. At a meeting in a school, a friend of mine was quickly asked: "What kind of drugs did you use 'there'?" The question was insulting. He did not go to anymore meetings. Although it is understandable: senior pupils who met with the "afghantsy" outside the main auditorium heard from them not only that which it was permissible to talk about in newspaper interviews, and on radio and TV. The gap between the truth and the stereotype was filled with disbelief. A new stereotype was born—a negative one...

It is not just ordinary soldiers who are soldier-internationalists. For some reason they do not write about this very often, except for the military press. Many officers and warrant officers, and sergeants and master sergeants on extended service gave the best years of their lives to Afghanistan.

We will not idealize. Somebody on the sly writes himself into a citation "for a little medal." Somebody, after flying for an hour over the southern state border puts a certificate in his pocket on the right to privileges and uses them. It is offensive when an officer—"afghanets" begins to be judged by these parasites.

When he returns to the Soviet Union after Afghanistan, he more and more frequently hears the questions: what kind of decorations did you receive (not what for, but what kind)? What did you bring back from "there"? How much did you earn? And they envy you that you have medal ribbon bars on your uniform jacket, that you also receive privileges and can buy goods in a "check" store, and that you get preference in getting into in an academy or some kind of position.

Therefore, at times army officials meet officer—"afghantsy" guardedly, and as potential competitors in their own career. One day a clerk of this sort said: "But, of course, if we were told to go to Afghanistan, we would go,

but we also are not sitting, we are working. But there they do not have discipline, nor uniform clothing, and, you see, they get into an academy without competing, and give them this, and give them that." But did this analyst calculate how much dust settled in the lungs and sand in the kidneys from salted Afghan water of those returning from there? Does he know how the blood pressure jumps and the head hurts after a concussion, and how the liver aches after jaundice?

Of course, not everyone returns from there as angels, and not everyone can successfully adjust to the work: now and then some are discharged. But still another stereotype has set in: the careerist, the speculator, the dashing warrior to whom nothing matters, to whom you should give everything, and do not complain [nie greshi].

And instead of lavishing attention on a person and creating a normal situation, everybody observes with satisfaction how he takes a false step, and, remaining silent, they make a helpless gesture, but when the fruit ripens they put the former internationalist in such a position that it is even uncomfortable for him to think about his service in the RA [Republic of Afghanistan]. .

Now they have started to write and say more about Afghanistan, and they also have begun to do a lot for the "afghantsy." But why did they consider orders secret that talk about privileges for servicemen who served in Afghanistan, and why do they still carefully conceal this here and there? You are not told about this when you depart on a tour of duty for 2 years, and not always when you return. .

Soviet military subunits will be withdrawn from Afghanistan soon, but the problems of the "afghantsy" will not disappear. Indeed, a government resolution about extra privileges for soldier-internationalists, their wives, widows, and parents was published 8 September in *IZVESTIYA*. This is just and right. But the question should not only be about state and material assistance, but also about private, personal, and humane help for these people.

I would not want these last lines to be construed as a stereotyped appeal that is usual in cases like this.

13052

New Benefits for Afghan Vets

Benefits Outlined

18010113 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian 9 Sep 88 p 2

[Article under the rubric "Official Department": "Concern for Soldier-Internationalists"]

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers approved a resolution "About Supplementary Measures for Improving the Material and Daily Living Conditions of Persons Who Performed International Duty in the Republic of Afghanistan, and of Their Families."

The government of the USSR has instructed the councils of ministers of union and autonomous republics and the ispolkoms of krays, oblasts, autonomous republics and okrugs, city (in cities of republic subordination) soviets of people's deputies to examine the question concerning the establishment of personal pensions of republic or local significance for disabled persons from among servicemen who became disabled as a result of a wound, concussion, severe injury or illness sustained while performing international duty in the Republic of Afghanistan, with due regard for their services, and also personal pensions, in the event of the loss of a principal wage earner, for members of families of servicemen who were killed or who died as a result of a wound, concussion, serious injury or illness sustained while fulfilling international duty in the Republic of Afghanistan.

Special scholarships in the sum of 100 rubles a month have been established for students of higher educational institutions and specialized secondary educational institutions from among former servicemen who became disabled as a result of a wound, concussion, serious injury or illness while performing international duty in the Republic of Afghanistan, and when the students are on full state security, the scholarship at higher educational institutions is in the sum of 40 rubles a month and at secondary specialized educational institutions, 30 rubles a month. Vocational school students from among the indicated former servicemen are paid a scholarship with an increase by 20 rubles a month, and those of them who are on full state security, a scholarship in the amount of 30 rubles a month.

The appropriate job placement offices are charged with the responsibility for arranging jobs, after discharge from active military service, for persons from among servicemen who performed international duty in the Republic of Afghanistan.

The following schedule of payments for work during industrial and economic training is established for former servicemen who performed international duty in the Republic of Afghanistan:

While learning a new profession (training of new workers), 100 percent of the wage rate of the worker is paid for the entire period of training;

While retraining, training for a second profession and improving qualifications, the average salary for a given profession and qualification is maintained for the entire period of training with a break from work.

Persons who performed international duty in the Republic of Afghanistan as servicemen are granted the right to receive non-interest bearing loans for the construction of homes in home-building cooperatives. Interest they had to pay on loans granted earlier for this purpose has been removed.

The councils of ministers of union and autonomous republics, departments, and ispolkoms of local soviets of people's deputies have been instructed to provide living space in 1988-1989 for families of servicemen, workers and employees who were killed or died as a result of a wound, concussion, serious injury or illness sustained while performing international duty in the Republic of Afghanistan and who do not have a dwelling place and need an improvement in living conditions.

It has been established that mothers of servicemen who were killed or died as a result of a wound, concussion, serious injury or illness sustained while performing international duty in the Republic of Afghanistan have a right to a pension after reaching 50 years of age in the event of the loss of a principal wage earner killed as a soldier.

The wives of servicemen who were killed, or other persons who are supporting the children of these servicemen, are granted a preferential right at the place of work to receive vouchers to rest homes or guest boarding houses for a holiday together with children, and also to receive vouchers to Pioneer camps for the children of the indicated servicemen.

The USSR Ministry of Culture has been instructed to examine the question of the construction of a soldier-internationalist monument in Moscow and to present an appropriate proposal on this question to the USSR Council of Ministers by 1 January 1989.

The application of this law also extends to laborers and office workers who provided support to the Soviet military contingent in the Republic of Afghanistan who sustained a wound, concussion or serious injury or who were decorated with USSR orders and medals for participating in the support of combat operations, and this also extends to their families.

This resolution is put into effect starting 1 July 1988.

Comments of RSFSR Social Security Minister
18010113 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Sep 88 p 1

[Interview conducted by T. Khudyakova under rubric "Panorama of News": "For the Soldier-Afghantsy"]

[Text] IZVESTIYA yesterday published a resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers concerning new privileges for soldier-“afghantsy” [Soviet soldiers who served in Afghanistan]. V. A. Kaznacheyev, social security minister, comments on it.

[Question] Viktor Alekseyevich, the resolution states that personal pensions will be established for soldier-“afghantsy” and members of their families. Please explain the procedure for their formulation.

[Answer] They are established on the application of ministries and departments and soviet and party offices. Disabled soldiers from among the soldier-internationalists should apply to the social security agencies locally, where they will be assisted in the preparation of all of the necessary documents.

In the Russian Federation, all questions concerning grants of personal pensions of a republic significance will be examined by appropriate commissions of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, and of local significance, by the council of ministers of autonomous republics, and by kray, oblast, autonomous oblast and okrug ispolkoms, and also by the Moscow and Leningrad city soviets of people's deputies.

[Question] And is the procedure the same for the members of families of soldiers who were killed or who died?

[Answer] Yes, but I should add the following. From now on the mothers of soldier-internationalists who were killed or who died have the right to a pension in the event of the loss of a principal wage earner by 5 years earlier than the regular period, i. e., after reaching 50 years of age. Moreover, this is regardless of whether they were dependents of the deceased or not.

[Question] Letters to the editor indicate that some disabled “afghantsy” are experiencing difficulties in getting employment, and that they do not have the conditions for social and work rehabilitation. And these, you see, are basically young people, and many of them are studying...

[Answer] The new resolution will partially help to remove the acuteness of the problem. As you know, special scholarships have been set up for students who are studying in tekhnikums and PTU's [vocational training school] and who were disabled in the performance of international duty. Material support is also being planned for those who are going through professional training.

Job placement assistance should be provided the discharged internationalists by the labor departments in the ispolkoms of local soviets. These agencies are entrusted with a special responsibility.

[Question] You will agree that “special responsibility” is a very vague concept.

[Answer] You are right. Unfortunately, this item in the resolution has more of a declarative character. And here one can depend mainly on the conscientiousness of the workers of the labor departments and their realization of a moral responsibility for the job placement of former soldiers.

But the situation with disabled persons is somewhat different. The fact is that there is a legislatively established 2-percent quota on work positions for the placement of the disabled. At every enterprise! But frequently either it is not used, or it is not used for this purpose. Another question, in our view, is that the size of the quota does not meet today's needs; it is too small, and we are preparing a proposal to the government to increase it. But this is a matter for the future. In the meantime, local social security offices with the help of party organizations, deputies, and workers of soviet ispolkoms should strive for a strict fulfillment of this item in the resolution, so that every disabled "afghanets" could find work he is capable of and that he likes.

[Question] Unfortunately, frequently in our life what happens is that a splendid resolution is issued, but then

everything does not go smoothly with its implementation. How does one ensure, for example, that all items of this resolution are implemented and that no one is left forgotten or offended?

[Answer] That which the social security bodies are responsible for will be under the continuous control of the ministries. We have prepared appropriate orders and recommendations and have distributed them locally. We will also send letters to the ispolkoms of local soviets.

But another matter is no less important: people should understand and require that which is prescribed by law. To do this, it is necessary to have full and reliable information about one's rights, which is impossible without widespread explanatory work. I trust that our conversation will serve this noble purpose.

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